POLAR BEARS, COLD WAR, AND QUESTIONS OF DUTY

The U.S. Intervention in Northern Russia (1918-1919)
Recommended Grade Levels: 10-12
Course/Content Area: U.S. History / World History

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ESSENTIAL QUESTIONS:

- What were the causes of American intervention in Russia in 1918-1919?
- How did American soldiers feel about their participation in the intervention?
- What were Russian perceptions of the American intervention?
- Did the American intervention in Russia contribute to the post-World War II Cold War?
SUMMARY: This lesson asks students to examine a little-known facet of World War I: the American intervention in North Russia, which began in 1918. Through primary and secondary sources, students will discover the reasons for President Wilson’s approval of the mission to Russia. Students will also use contemporary accounts to assess the morale of the soldiers. Finally, if time allows, documents are provided to allow students the opportunity to discern whether the seeds of the Cold War were actually sown in the snows of North Russia in 1918 and 1919.

STANDARDS ALIGNMENT: Common Core Standards:

CCSS.ELA-Literacy.RH.11-12.1: Cite specific textual evidence to support analysis of primary and secondary sources, connecting insights gained from specific details to an understanding of the text as a whole.
CCSS.ELA-Literacy.RH.11-12.2: Determine the central ideas or information of a primary or secondary source; provide an accurate summary that makes clear the relationships among the key details and ideas.
CCSS.ELA-Literacy.RH.11-12.3: Evaluate various explanations for actions or events and determine which explanation best accords with textual evidence, acknowledging where the text leaves matters uncertain.
CCSS.ELA-Literacy.RH.11-12.6: Evaluate authors’ differing points of view on the same historical event or issue by assessing the authors’ claims, reasoning, and evidence.
CCSS.ELA-Literacy.RH.11-12.7: Integrate and evaluate multiple sources of information presented in diverse formats and media (e.g., visually, quantitatively, as well as in words) in order to address a question or solve a problem.
CCSS.ELA-Literacy.RH.11-12.8: Evaluate an author’s premises, claims, and evidence by corroborating or challenging them with other information.
CCSS.ELA-Literacy.RH.11-12.9: Integrate information from diverse sources, both primary and secondary, into a coherent understanding of an idea or event, noting discrepancies among sources.

TIME NEEDED: 2-4 60-minute class periods (depending on student ability and length of discussion)

OBJECTIVES: Students will:
- Analyze primary and secondary sources to discover the reasons for the 1918 American intervention in North Russia.
- Determine the reasons for the reportedly low morale of American soldiers by reading their opinions of the expedition.
- Analyze post-World War I sources to assess whether the American intervention had any role in causing the Cold War.

INTERDISCIPLINARY: Lesson presents the opportunity to examine war poetry and prose related to the war. Lesson could be expanded to include a discussion of the political and international importance of northern ports as the Arctic warms and nations scramble to claim its resources and transit routes.
THEMES & CONNECTIONS:
- 20th century American foreign policy
- Origins of the Cold War

MATERIALS NEEDED:
- Student background reading (provided)
- Document sets and analysis sheets (provided – Appendices A, B, C)
BACKGROUND INFORMATION

When we think of World War I, many things come to mind, including trenches, the mechanization of warfare and the Western Front. Some people may also have an understanding of the Eastern Front and the Russian Revolution. However, what few realize is the war took on another dimension when the United States chose to intervene in the Arctic and Siberian regions of Russia during the waning days of the Great War. You will be examining the so-called “American Intervention in Northern Russia” and the troops chosen to participate in this unusual and unsung chapter of history. The soldiers involved came to call themselves “Polar Bears.” Theirs is an interesting story of American politics and policies with potential long-term global repercussions. Using a number of primary sources, you will examine President Wilson’s reasons for the American intervention and read about the soldiers’ perceptions of their role in Russia and their personal attitudes.

The 5,000 soldiers who comprised the Northern Russian Expeditionary Force came from the U.S. Army’s 85th Infantry division, which hailed from Fort Custer in Battle Creek, Michigan. For this reason, and because many World War One divisions were created from nearby reserve units, many of the soldiers in the 85th were from the upper midwest, particularly Wisconsin and Michigan, which gave rise to the feeling that the 85th was “Michigan’s Own” or “Detroit’s Boys.”

After an abbreviated period of basic training at Fort Custer, the 85th Division was transported on trains to Long Island, New York, from where they set sail on July 21, 1918. After nearly two weeks at sea, the division reached Liverpool, England, and began to undertake additional training in preparation for their imminent departure for France and the Western Front.

It wasn’t long before the officers of the 85th were informed that plans had changed, and that portions of the division would be sent to Northern Russia. The soldiers of the division began to realize that perhaps they were not going to France when some regiments were issued Russian Nagant rifles and new “Shackleton Boots,” which had been worn on the famous expedition to Antarctica.

Soldiers from Company B, 339th Infantry on Patrol in North Russia
Ultimately, it was the 339th Infantry Regiment of the 85th Division, along with parts of the 310th Engineer Regiment, that was tasked with going to Northern Russia to engage in a still-controversial and little-known front of the First World War. The Polar Bears remained in Russia well into 1919, returning home to Detroit in July. By the end of their deployment, the soldiers had spent over nine months in Russia and had suffered over two hundred casualties.
LESSON
DIRECTIONS:

INTRODUCTION:
While this lesson is designed to open many different avenues and create many opportunities for discussion of World War I, 20th century American foreign policy, and the Cold War, it can also be used simply as an exploration of a relatively unknown chapter of World War I—the American intervention in Northern Russia during 1918 and 1919. The lesson can be used on its own, or as an adjunct to any of the periods/units mentioned above.

Students should have some basic background knowledge of World War I, the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, Marxism, and Wilson’s Fourteen Points and League of Nations.

Included with the lesson is a brief “Student Background Reading” which can be used to introduce students to the intervention. Also included are three separate collections of primary and secondary sources: Rationale (10 documents), Morale (18 documents), and Russian Perspective (11 documents), and document analysis sheets for each separate source.

Links to further resources, including Signal Corps images, soldiers’ diaries and scrapbooks, and contemporary video, can be found below.

SEQUENCE:
Ideally the whole class will engage with each set of documents. This will help them develop a more complete and nuanced perspective of this important event.

Part One – Rationale:
1. Student groups review sources.
   Divide the class into small groups and distribute the Rationale sources (included with transcripts of the sources are images of the original when available). It is suggested that you begin with Rationale, since this sets the stage for U.S. involvement in Russia.

   Some sources are deliberately longer and more complicated than others, just as some of the analysis sheets require more inferential and critical thinking. For smaller classes, each group could be responsible for more than one source, just as larger classes could have more than one group evaluating some of the longer and more complicated sources. Once all groups have finished evaluating their source(s), you might redistribute the sources, so that each group can evaluate additional sources or, if time is an issue, you could move on.

2. Class discussion.
   After students have reviewed source material it is important to bring the class together for a whole group discussion and evaluation of what was learned about American rationale for intervening in North Russia in 1918-1919. Using whiteboard/poster paper/mind-mapping software, create a whole-class list of reasons for American intervention that can be referred to later in the unit.
Part Two – Morale:

1. Student groups review sources.
   The second aspect of American intervention that should be explored is Morale. Complete the same process as with the Rationale resources. Again, documents are deliberately of different lengths and reading levels and separate analysis sheets are included for each document that require different levels of thought.

2. Class discussion.
   As with Rationale, use a whole-class discussion to evaluate the morale of American soldiers who participated in the intervention, and create a list of reasons for their sinking morale.

3. Extension Activity – Comparison of soldier accounts and literary portrayals of war
   As an extension, the class can compare the realities of the morale of the American Expeditionary Forces with various World War I poems to examine whether there is a disconnect between literary portrayals of World War I soldiers and their mindset and the actual accounts of soldiers. Recommended poems include “The Call” by Jesse Pope, “Pro Patria” by Owen Seaman, “Dulce et Decorum Est” by Wilfred Owen, and “The Soldier” by Rupert Brooke. Another interesting and powerful source would be an excerpt from Johnny Got His Gun by Dalton Trumbo, in which a seriously wounded American soldier contemplates the reasons for the War and his resulting wounds.

Part Three – Perspectives:

1. Student groups review sources.
   The final part of this lesson relates to the Russian perspective of the American/Allied intervention in 1918 and 1919. As before, distribute the Russian Perspective documents to small groups for analysis.

2. Class discussion.
   When the class is finished, create another list of ways the Russians perceived the intervention. Complete this list on a T-chart next to the list generated regarding American rationale for the intervention.

3. Extension – Explain Cold War origins
   A whole-class discussion can also examine the varying American and Russian perspectives of the intervention and how those perspectives might have influenced US/USSR relations in the decades following World War I. Compare the adjectives and/or tone used by each side to describe the intervention. This discussion can easily be used to help explain the reasons for the origins of the Cold War and how misperceptions often influence world events.

POST-ASSESSMENT:
Summative assessment could be accomplished in a number of ways, including:

- Students write a letter from the perspective of President Wilson that accurately represents Wilson's views while also addressing the soldiers’ concerns.
- Students conduct a discussion/debate over whether the breach in relations caused by the intervention was irreparable. (Did it truly lead to the Cold War?)
- Students compare the experiences of soldiers on the Western Front with the experiences of the Polar Bears, perhaps by using “Operation War Diary” or “Measuring the ANZACs” (see Additional Resources below).
- Students act as a “mediator” between the US and USSR to try to ease the tensions brought on by the intervention.
MODIFICATIONS/ACCOMMODATIONS
While this assignment is not modified according to the reading/writing abilities of students, accommodations can be made by selectively assigning various documents. For example, Documents C and E in the Rationale section (Appendix A) are somewhat longer and require more inference and critical thinking skills than do Documents F, G, and H. Additionally, students could be challenged to look further into questions of morale using World War I poetry, songs of the period, or contemporary accounts. For students of extremely limited ability, photos of the Russian intervention could stand in for the “Morale” documents. Photos are available at the Bentley Historical Library (see the Further Resources section of this lesson) and could be used to infer how soldiers may have felt about, or reacted to, the conditions depicted in the photographs.
Appendix A – Rationale for American Involvement

Rationale Documents A-J appear on the following pages of Appendix A.
Excerpts from President Wilson’s Aide Memoire (7-17-1919)

It is the clear and fixed judgment of the Government of the United States, arrived at after repeated and very searching reconsiderations of the whole situation in Russia, that military intervention there would add to the present sad confusion in Russia rather than cure it, injure her rather than help her, and that it would be of no advantage in the prosecution of our main design, to win the war against Germany. It cannot, therefore, take part in such intervention or sanction it in principle. Military intervention would, in its judgment, even supposing it to be efficacious in its immediate avowed object of delivering an attack upon Germany from the east, be merely a method of making use of Russia, not a method of serving her…

Whether from Vladivostok or from Murmansk and Archangel, the only legitimate object for which American or allied troops can be employed, it submits, is to guard military stores which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense…

It yields, also, to the judgment of the Supreme Command in the matter of establishing a small force at Murmansk, to guard the military stores at Kola and to make it safe for Russian forces to come together in organized bodies in the north. But it owes it to frank counsel to say that it can go no further than these modest and experimental plans. It is not in a position and has no expectation of being in a position, to take part in organized intervention in adequate force from either Vladivostok or Murmansk and Archangel…
President Wilson’s Address at Des Moines, Iowa (9-6-1919):

[In other parts of Europe the poison [of Bolshevism] spread the poison of disorder, the poison of revolt, the poison of chaos. And do you honestly think, my fellow citizens, that none of that poison has got in the veins of this free people? Do you not know that the world is all now one single whispering gallery? Those antenna of the wireless telegraph are the symbols of our age. All the impulses of mankind are thrown out upon the air and reach to the ends of the earth; quietly upon steamships, silently under the cover of the Postal Service, with the tongue of the wireless and the tongue of the telegraph, all the suggestions of disorder are spread through the world. Money coming from nobody knows where is deposited by the millions in capitals like Stockholm, to be used for the propaganda of disorder and discontent and dissolution throughout the world, and men look you calmly in the face in America and say they are for that sort of revolution, when that sort of revolution means government by terror, government by force, not government by vote. It is the negation of everything that is American; but it is spreading, and so long as disorder continues, so long as the world is kept waiting for the answer to the question, What kind of peace are we going to have and what kind of guaranties are there to be behind that peace? That poison will steadily spread more and more rapidly, spread until it may be that even this beloved land of ours will be distracted and distorted by it.}

John Cudahy in *Archangel – The American War with Russia* (1924):

After Brest-Litovsk, it was generally believed that the ambitions of Germany in Russia were:

1. To recruit her war wasted divisions from the great number of Austrian and German prisoners in Russia.
2. To exploit the great natural resources of the Ukraine, Courland, Lithuania and Estonia.
3. To align on her eastern frontier buffer states from Finland to the Caucasus with Persia as the last link in the chain.
4. To seize great stores of war munitions at Archangel and Vladivostok.

It was as firm conviction in Allied Councils that the Germans had immense forces in Finland, while the German Imperial Staff thought that the insignificant hundreds that the British landed at Murmansk in April... were... perhaps several divisions.

During the winter of 1919, American soldiers, in the uniform of their country, killed Russians and were killed by Russians, yet the Congress of the United States never declared war upon Russia. Our war was with Germany, but no German prisoners were ever taken... nor... was there ever found any evidence that Germany fought in their ranks... [and there was] no visible sign of connection between the Bolsheviks and the Central Powers.

The objects of the Expedition, as defined in a pamphlet of information given out by British General Headquarters, in the early days of the campaign, were:

1. To form a military barrier inside which the Russians could reorganize themselves to drive out the German invader.
2. To assist the Russians to reorganize their army by instruction, supervision and example on more reasonable principles than the old regime autocratic discipline.
3. To reorganize the food supplies, making up the deficiencies from Allied countries...

...[T]his proclamation was issued to the troops by the military authorities:

Proclamation: There seems to be among the troops a very indistinct idea of what we are fighting for here in North Russia. This can be explained in a few words. We are up against Bolshevism, which means anarchy pure and simple. Look at Russia at the present moment. The power is in the hands of a few men, mostly Jews, who have succeeded in bringing the country to such a stat that order is non-existent. Bolshevism has grown upon the uneducated masses to such an extent that Russia is disintegrated and helpless, and therefore we have come to help her get rid of the disease that is eating her up.

...[T]he Foreign Relation Committee... replied that American troops were needed to protect great stores of Allied ammunition at Archangel, and to hold the port until terms of peace were signed with Germany. That Germany wanted Archangel to establish a submarine base there, and it would be cowardly to forsake Russia.

If we were at war with Russia in 1919, we are still at war with her. Peace was never made with Russia; and peace will never be made in the hearts of those plain people in the Vaga and Dvina villages, who
saw their pitifully meager possessions confiscated in the cause of “friendly intervention,” their lowly homes set ablaze and themselves turned adrift to find shelter in the cheerless snows.

Friendly intervention? All too vividly comes to mind a picture during the Allied occupation of Archangel Province while the statesmen at Paris pondered and deliberated in a futile attempt to find dignified escapement from this shameful illegitimate little war.

Excerpts (page images) from *The history of the American Expedition Fighting the Bolshevik: Campaigning in North Russia 1918-1919* by Captains J.R. Moore, H.H. Mead, and L.E. Jahns:

Why American Troops Were Sent to Russia (p. 47-50):

To many people in America and England and France the North Russian Expedition appears to have been an unwarrantable invasion of the land of an ally, an ally whose land was torn by internal upheavals. It has been charged that commercial cupidity conceived the campaign. Men declare that certain members of the cabinet of Lloyd George and of President Wilson were desirous of protecting their industrial holdings in North Russia.

Early in 1918, for the Allied forces, it looked dark. The Germans were able to neglect the crumbled-in Eastern Front and concentrate a tornado drive on the Western Front. It was at last realized that the controlling Bolshevik faction in Russia was bent on preventing the resumption of the war on the Eastern Front and possibly might play its feeble remnants of military forces on the side of the Germans. The Allied Supreme Council at Versailles decided that the other allies must go to the aid of their old ally Russia who had done such great service in the earlier years of the war. On the Russian war front Germany must be made again to feel pressure of arms. Organization of that front would have to be made by efforts of the Allied Supreme War Council.

They had some forces to build on. Several thousand Czecho-Slovak troops formerly on the Eastern Front had been held together after the dissolution of the last Russian offensive in 1917. Their commander had led them into Siberia. Some at that time even went as far as Vladivostok. These troops had desired to go back to their own country or to France and take part in the final campaign against the Germans. There was no transportation by way of the United States. Negotiations with the Bolshevik rulers of Russia, the story runs, brought promises of safe passage westward across central Russia and then northward to Archangel, thence by ship to France.
This situation in mind the Allied Supreme War Council urged a plan whereby an Allied expedition of respectable size would be sent to Archangel with many extra officers for staff and instruction work, to meet the Czechs and reorganize and re-equip them, rally about them a large Northern Russian Army, and proceed rapidly southward to reorganize the Eastern Front and thus draw off German troops from the hard pressed Western Front. This plan was presented to the Allied Supreme War Council by a British officer and politician fresh from Moscow and Petrograd and Archangel, enthusiastic in his belief in the project.

While this plan was still in the whispering stages, the activities of the Germans in Finland where they menaced Petrograd and where their extension of three divisions to the northward and eastward seemed to forecast the establishment of submarine bases on the Murmansk and perhaps even at Archangel where lay enormous stores of munitions destined earlier in the war to be used by the Russians and Rumanians against the Huns. At any rate, the port of Archangel would be one other inlet for food supplies to reach the tightly blockaded Germans.

All this was of great interest to the Allied Supreme War Council because of the danger that the war supplies would be seized by the rapidly emboldened Bolshevik government and be delivered into the hands of the Germans for use against the Allies. For since the Brest-Litovsk treaty it had appeared from many things that the crafty hand of Germany was inside the Russian Bolshevik glove.

Moreover, there were in North Russia, as in every other part, many Russians who could not resign themselves to Bolshevik control, even of the milder sort, nor to any German influence. Those in the Archangel district banded themselves together secretly and sent repeated calls to the Allies for help in ridding their territory of the Bolshevik Red Guards and German agents, using as chief arguments the factors above mentioned. While the anti-Bolshevists were unwilling to unmask in their own state, for obvious reason, their call for help was made clear to the outside world and furnished the Allied Supreme War Council just the pretext for the expedition which it was planning for a purely military purpose, namely, to reconstruct the old Eastern fighting front.
Even this concession of President Wilson was limited to the one regiment of infantry with the needed accompaniments of engineer and medical troops. The bitter irony of this limitation is apparent in the fact that while it allowed the Supreme War Council to carry out its scheme of an Allied Expedition with the publicly announced purposes before outlined, committing America and the other Allies to the guarding of supplies at Murmansk and Archangel and frustrating the plans of Germany in North Russia, it did not permit the Allied War Council sufficient forces to carry out its ultimate and of course secret purpose of reorganizing the Eastern Front, which naturally was not to be advertised in advance either to Russians or to anyone. The vital aim was thus thwarted and the expedition destined to weakness and to future political and diplomatic troubles both in North Russia and in Europe and America.

https://archive.org/details/historyofamerica00moor.
Excerpts from *America’s Secret War Against Bolshevism* by David S. Foglesong:

Wilson did not see any immediate danger [of Bolshevism] in America. Yet he could not be silent in the face of Soviet propaganda: “if the appeal of the Bolsheviki was allowed to remain unanswered, if nothing were done to counteract it, the effect would be great and would increase.”

[American labor reformers William E. Walling and Samuel Gompers warned that Lenin’s] “world wide class war” against imperialist governments, including the United States [posed] “a very grave danger…” that a revolutionary strike movement would develop in Italy and France and spread from there first to England and then to “Chicago, New York, San Francisco and our other foreign industrial centers.” Thus, in addition to formulating an early version of the “domino theory,” Gompers and Walling were conjuring the specter of urban immigrant radicalism that had haunted Wilson and Lansing for decades.

In the first half of 1918 Wilson resisted proposals for direct military intervention in Russia, in part because that would erode the difference between the “moral position” of America and the unprincipled policy of Germany. However, as concern about internal and international disorder mounted, Wilson faced intensified pressure for action in Russia.

Wilson worried in mid-October [of 1918] that “the spirit of the Bolsheviki is lurking everywhere.” He expressed particular concern about “the foreign born population [of the United States], such as the Italians.”

In August 1919 [Colonel James] Ruggles warned from Archangel [Russia] that “no government will be safe… as long as this Bolshevik Government exists which has repeatedly declared its intention to destroy all other governments.” Frightened by the Bolsheviks’ “clever and very dangerous” propaganda, Ruggles urged: “It is far better to kill the head—here in Russia—than to run the risk of having to do it at home.” Elihu Root agreed, urging Americans to “fight Bolshevism at its centre, at its source.” Ambassador David Francis, similarly, “advocated the eradication of Bolshevism in Russia,” arguing that it was in America’s “interest to exterminate it in the land of its birth.” “All of the unrest throughout Europe and in [the United States],” Francis explained, “can be traced back to this Bolshevik experiment in Russia.”

[By mid-1919] there was a new incentive: dramatizing the menace of Bolshevism might help rally support [within the United States] for the League of Nations. On August 14 Wilson informed [Secretary of State] Lansing that he might find an opportunity “to warn the country against Bolshevism in some way that may attract attention.”

[During his cross-country speaking tour in September 1919] Wilson implicitly [linked] immigrants to the menace of Bolshevism in the “veins” of America, [charging] that “a hyphen” was the “most un-American thing in the world” and [comparing] it to “a dagger” that immigrants were “ready to plunge into the vitals of this Republic.” State Department officials responsible for implementing American policy toward Russia shared Wilson’s fear of immigrant radicalism. Lansing, for example, believed that many of the newer immigrants were infected “with fanciful and vicious theories of social order,” and had brought “to our shores the germs of sedition and revolution.” Using images similar to Wilson’s, [Secretary of State] Lansing cried, “The national life blood is being diluted and corrupted by this influx of immigrants” who were in many cases “secretly intent upon changing our institutions.”
American representatives in and around Russia also spied a Jewish plot. The U.S. commissioner to the Baltic provinces, for example, insisted that “the Russian Revolution has largely been engineered by the Jews. Bolshevism is their great revenge.” Herbert Hoover, head of the American Relief Administration, similarly struck by “the very large majority of Jews” in the leadership of “Communistic outbreaks,” determined that “the plague of social arson” was “the penalty that the Gentile is paying for his injustice of the past.”

Wilson also shared with [Secretary of State] Lansing and other members of his cabinet an anxiety about increasing African American militancy, which many Americans blamed on Bolshevik propaganda. In July 1918, Secretary of War Newton Baker advised Wilson that he was “much disturbed” by the situation “among the negroes,” since “reports of the Military Intelligence Branch of the Army seem to indicate more unrest among them than in years.” Later, military intelligence officers asserted that Soviet emissary Ludwig Martins, [who acted as an unofficial Soviet ambassador to the U.S. from 1919 to 1921], “has been actively financing plans for an uprising among the negroes,” and legislators and journalists made similar charges…

Sailing across the Atlantic in March 1919 [Wilson’s] doctor heard him say that blacks in America had grown more demanding, that black soldiers in France had been placed on the same level as whites and it had “gone to their heads,” and that “the American negro returning from abroad would be our greatest medium in conveying bolshevism to America.”

[Secretary of State Lansing believed that] the Bolsheviks were “dangerous—more so than Germany,” since they denied nationality and the right to own private property and had “threatened us with revolution.”

[Army] Chief of Staff March stressed that “all responsible military opinion believes that the War will be won or lost on the western front, … that any substantial diversion of troops from that one object is a serious military mistake,” and that none of the Allies would “ever be able to reconstitute Russia into a military machine.”

When March and Secretary of War Baker conferred with Wilson “about the Murmansk expedition” in July they could not “see the military value of the proposal,” so they assumed “that other considerations moved in favor of it.

Interview with Frederick Kooyers, member of the Polar Bear Expedition:

Lenning: Looking back, what is your understanding of the purpose of the American troops’ presence in North Russia?

Kooyers: We were never given any idea. When we got in England, all of a sudden the only reason why we went to Russia was you had so many Poles and Slavs [in our unit] who could talk the Russian language. That’s why our outfit was picked to go to Russia. We had no idea. We were supposed to go to France.

Lenning: Did you ever discover the purpose of the expedition?

Kooyers: No. Just like I say, through the grapevine, they told us [we] were there to stop the Germans from going across the country loading their submarines. Now, I don’t know. It sounds feasible to me, ‘cause we had no reason to fight Russia. It was their war and we had no right to be there.

Lenning: In other words, did you perhaps feel that the American troops were only interfering?

Kooyers: I think mostly [our] attitude as we fought there-we had no reason to be there. We knew that, and we couldn’t get out.
Interview with James Siplon, member of the Polar Bear Expedition:

Johnson: Where did you hear that you were in Russia to prevent the Germans from establishing a submarine base? Was that officially told to you, or just rumor?

Siplon: Well, when we asked questions, that was told to us by our colonel. Colonel Stewart was the commander of the regiment, and he had a regimental review and he told us as far as he could explain it himself, as far as he knew, that’s what we were up there for.

Johnson: Was that before the armistice was signed?

Siplon: Oh, well that was when we were going there, and the reason why we were going there when we were still in England, and the reason why we were in England, and the reason why we were being transported to Russia, just before we were shipped to Russia: and the reason that we were going there—to keep the Germans from having any access to any ports in Northern Russia for their submarine warfare.

Interview with Levi Bartels, member of the Polar Bear Expedition:

Johnson: Do you have any reason why you were over there? Why do you think you went over there?

Bartels: We were borrowed to England. England was the pusher to that whole thing. President Wilson, he was in his second term then of course, and his slogan was too, in the winter months, “Vote for Wilson to keep us out of the war.” Well that dirty louse you might say, while he was doing that, the minute he got elected you might say he was building barracks in Ireland there already. He was building barracks for American [soldiers] there. In England see they, well, the British controlled the whole time, everything. British rations and everything…. 
Interview with Rudolph Marxer, member of the Polar Bear Expedition:

Johnson: Do you feel that there was any justification for the allied involvement?

Marxer: Well, the only reason was because the Germans were going to come—that was why we were there, to keep the Germans from coming in the back way.

Johnson: How about after the armistice?

Marxer: I don’t know what they kept us up there for. I don’t know what for, they kept us up there—we sat up there in July…. I didn’t like it one bit.

Johnson: How prevalent was that attitude?

Marxer: Oh, towards the end the attitudes—oh, very prevalent. Towards the end it did. You see, because it was getting to that. They wanted to get home, see….
U.S. Ambassador David R. Francis:

[U.S. Ambassador to Russia] David R. Francis wanted to go back to Petrograd along with 50,000 American soldiers and comparable Allied forces “to restore order in the interest of humanity and consequently to suppress bolshevism.” This mission was necessary, Francis argued, because the Bolsheviks “were endeavoring to promote a world wide social revolution, and… if it succeeded in Russia, it would be a menace… to every European country and would not spare even our own.”

Ambassador Francis to Navy Captain Newton McCully:

“I am determined not to leave Russia unless forced to do so but if these damned Bolsheviks are permitted to remain in control of this country it will not only be lost to its own devoted people but Bolshevik rule will undermine all governments and be a menace to society.”

Ambassador Francis’ message to American soldiers in North Russia:

The Bolsheviks, who control the Soviet Government, are completely under the domination of Germany and consequently in resisting them you are not only performing a humanitarian service but you are preventing Germany from securing a much stronger foothold in Russia than she has up to this time been able to establish. Your service is as important as that which any American soldiers or Allied troops are performing anywhere.


Excerpts from President Wilson’s Aide Memoire (7-17-1919)

President Wilson argues that American soldiers can be deployed to Russia only for a limited purpose. What is that purpose?

Wilson also states that American soldiers are “not in a position and has no expectation of being in a position….“ What does he mean by this?
President Wilson’s Address at Des Moines, Iowa (9-6-1919):

According to this speech, what is President Wilson’s opinion of “Bolshevism”? Why might he have this opinion?

How might this speech set the stage for a more active American involvement in North Russia in 1918 and 1919?
John Cudahy in *Archangel – The American War with Russia* (1924):

According to the author, why were the Allies concerned about German intentions in western Russia?

How did the British explain the Allied intervention in Russia?

How did military authorities explain the Allied intervention in Russia?

How did the U.S. Foreign Relations committee explain American involvement in Northern Russia?

According to this author, how might Allied intervention in Northern Russia have influenced the Russian population?
Excerpts (page images) from *The history of the American Expedition Fighting the Bolsheviki: Campaigning in North Russia 1918-1919* by Captains J.R. Moore, H.H. Mead, and L.E. Jahns:

According to the authors, why did Allied troops intervene in Northern Russia?

Consider the “tone” of the source. Does the Allied intervention seem to be a noble undertaking, or one driven by political expediency or national interest?
Excerpts from *America’s Secret War Against Bolshevism* by David S. Foglesong:

When was this source written? Does this make the source more or less credible when trying to determine the reasons for American intervention in Northern Russia in 1918-1919?

What role did anti-Bolshevism play in Wilson’s decision to commit American troops to Russia?

Why did Wilson feel that an anti-Bolshevik stance might generate support for the League of Nations?

Is it right to use fear (in this case anti-Bolshevism) to create support for something (in this case the League of Nations)? Was it right to commit American soldiers (perhaps a small “wrong”) in order to help create the League of Nations (perhaps a large “right”)?

What were Wilson’s feelings about immigrants? How did these feelings influence his decision to commit troops to Northern Russia?

What was the opinion of some U.S. government officials regarding Judaism? How did these feelings contribute to the decision to commit American soldiers to Northern Russia?

Did American racism seem to play a role in Wilson’s decision? How did Wilson intend to use “the American negro” as a way of “conveying bolshevism to America?”
Interview with Frederick Kooyers, member of the Polar Bear Expedition:

According to this source, why were American troops deployed to North Russia?

What was Kooyers’ opinion of the American intervention in North Russia?
Interview with James Siplon, member of the Polar Bear Expedition:

According to this source, why were American troops deployed to North Russia?
Interview with Levi Bartels, member of the Polar Bear Expedition:

According to this source, why were American troops deployed to North Russia?
Interview with Rudolph Marxer, member of the Polar Bear Expedition

According to this source, why were American troops deployed to North Russia?
Excerpts from U.S. Ambassador Francis:

Why does Ambassador Francis insist that American troops must be sent to Northern Russia?

How does Ambassador Francis connect Bolshevism to the fight against Germany?
Appendix B – Morale of US Soldiers

Morale Documents A-R appear on the following pages of Appendix B.
Excerpts from Situation Reports on the Efficiency and Morale of the AEF, North Russia, Dec 1918-Mar 1919 (December 2nd 1918):

The morale of our troops has been low since the signing of the armistice with Germany. The men and some of the officers seem unable to understand why they should be kept in Russia after fighting has stopped with Germany, they profess to believe that American troops are being used to further selfish designs of England upon Russian territory and resources. Our troops are split up into small detachments covering numerous portions of a wide front with the chief command invariably in British hands, frequently a “local” rank being given to retain seniority. Several of these British officers have been grossly inefficient. The attitude of the others toward the American has been such as to cause great irritation and exasperation. As a result there is much friction and bad feeling between our troops and the British.

Some of our detachments have undergone great hardships; some have received winter clothing within the past few days only. There have been numerous cases of trench feet due to long exposure in the mud and water of the marshy country in which they operate. There has been some dissatisfaction with the British ration with which no coffee is furnished.
Morale of American Troops on Dvina Front by Captain Prince (2-2-1919):

“The general feeling seems to be that the men consider that the objectives for which they were sent here now do not exist. The purpose of the expedition was to protect the stores at Archangel and Murmansk and the ports on the White Sea and Arctic from falling into the hands of the Germans and now that there is no danger of this there does not seem to be any further reason for us to remain here. As a sergeant summarized it ‘Men are disgusted because they do not know why we are here fore, we came to fight Germany and help establish an Eastern front, now that is ancient history and they do not see why we stay here for. Evidently there is some hidden purpose and we are here for economic purposes or for acquisition of territorial or other concessions. This means we are fighting for capital. We had no right to come here to fight Russians. Bolsheviks are now fighting for their liberty and the Russian people should be allowed to straighten out themselves their difficulties.’ This feeling is shared to quite an extent by officers and a British flying lieutenant expressed himself in the same terms to an American soldier, who repeated his words to me.”

“Regarding the present operations, the men feel that they are contrary to the policy announced when the ANREF was sent to Russia. They came here to guard Archangel and [a] zone of 30 miles around it and instead they have now been fighting for four months over 200 miles away from Archangel under the most difficult conditions.”

“Another depressing factor was the lack of artillery and troops by the Allies and the men say, that if our governments really intended to carry on operations here they would have provided the necessary equipment and men for the purpose.”
Excerpts from "Situation Reports on the Efficiency and Morale of the AEF" (2-17-1919):

Due to primitive conditions of life and continuous service in the field under almost Arctic conditions officers and men are beginning to feel the strain. Practically the whole allied command has been on continuous duty in the field all winter with no reserves in Archangel.

Recommend that present force be entirely replaced as early as practicable in spring with an adequate force commensurable with its mission supplied equipped so that it can operate in an American way.

Signed, Stewart
Paragraph 1. For Chief of Staff and Secretary of War. The following telegrams relating to conditions in Russia have been received from Stewart dated February 13th. “Replying to 395 & prior Ruggles February 8th transmit the following report. 1st. Condition of infantry health discipline morale clothing and equipment excellent this also applies to Engineers and sanitary auxiliaries. Rations good. 2nd The tactical efficiency of the regiment is only limited by the capacity training and experience of its officers all of whom excepting the two seniors are National Army officers of 18 months service both officers and men have performed valiant field service beyond my expectation. The present front covers and outpost line 400 miles in length at a distance ranging from 100 to 260 miles from Archangel and for convenience may be divided into six sectors viz: Pinega area Dvina River Yaga River Seletskoe area Valogda Railroad and Odnina front. Since the withdrawal from Shemank 24th January to Shavovari the enemy has been very active in that area and also in the area between the Yaga River and Valogda Railroad enemy has been repulsed everywhere and Allied local offensives have generally been successful. American detachments are serving in every sector in conjunction with Allied troops and also on lines of communication. The port of Archangel should be opened to navigation about the middle of May. The upper reaches of Dvina River probably 15 or 20 days earlier. Supplementary report

Supplementary to message of this date: Due to primitive conditions of life and continuous service in the field under almost Arctic conditions officers and men are beginning to feel the strain. Practically the whole Allied command has been on continuous duty in the field all winter with no reserves in Archangel. Limited Allied reserves are now being supplied from Murmansk a few coming on ice breakers and other by rail to Kem and then by horses and sleds to destination. Recommend that present force be entirely replaced as early as practicable in Spring with an adequate force commensurate with its mission supplied equipped so that it can operate in an American way.”

Office from General Ironside Commanding Allied Expeditionary Forces Archangel

“Having personally visited every hospital and addressing station in this country I consider the medical arrangements excellent. The evacuation in this climate of casualties by sledge over 120 miles of road has been very efficient and with minimum of suffering. The health of the American troops is very good there being from all causes under 4% in hospital. Winter has been very mild. Food is suitable and sufficient. The poor sanitation of the country does not matter in winter and for troops in spring sanitation is being improved by all possible means. No infectious disease. There is hospital accommodations for 40% American and Allied troops of force and adequate means of increasing. Medical equipment and stores are adequate. There is an ambulance train on railway for 100 cases and 100 ambulance sledges. Major Langley Senior American Medical Officer who is working with our D.M.O. has expressed himself satisfied.” Pershing

Excerpt from “Situation Reports on the Efficiency and Morale of the AEF”:

The American regimental commander, Colonel Stewart, while a man of good principles, lacks force and accepts without protest conditions imposed upon his forces by the British High Command which are detrimental to the maintenance of the morale of his regiment and prejudicial to American national interests. Colonel Stewart remains habitually at Archangel and rarely visits the bulk of his command, which is scattered in small outpost detachments over a wide area.

The British High Command has so distributed the Allied forces that nearly all the positions in which fighting with the Bolsheviks is likely to occur are occupied principally or solely by American forces. This situation, the fact that the men are located at remote outposts with little means of communication with Archangel and with practically no personal contact with their regimental commander, their failure to understand why they are fighting or what they are fighting for, and the effects in some cases of Bolshevist propaganda, have produced a low state of morale in the American forces. The men and officers feel that they are not accomplishing and cannot accomplish any useful objective in North Russia; they resent the treatment they have received from the British High Command, and urge that they be withdrawn immediately from North Russia.
3. The consignment to Archangel by the British Government of large quantities of liquor has resulted in excessive drinking among the English officers but not among the English soldiers and very little among the American officers, and not at all so far as was observed, among the American soldiers. This condition was subversive of discipline and contributed in bringing about a state of low morale. For a considerable period the British High Command issued a regular ration of rum to the American soldiers, which practice was finally stopped as a result of protests.

The habitual use of liquor by the English in North Russia, particularly in Archangel, has created among the better class of Russians in that city a strong feeling of antipathy toward the Allies.

4. The American regimental commander, Colonel Stewart, while a man of good principles, lacks force and accepts without protest conditions imposed upon his forces by the British High Command which are detrimental to the maintenance of the morale of his regiment and prejudicial to American national interests. Colonel Stewart remains habitually at Archangel and rarely visits the bulk of his command, which is scattered in small outpost detachments over a wide area.

5. The British High Command has so distributed the Allied forces that nearly all the positions in which fighting with the Bolsheviks is likely to occur are occupied principally or solely by American forces. This situation, the fact that the men are located at remote outposts with little means of communication with Archangel and with practically no personal contact with their regimental commander, their failure to understand why they are fighting or what they are fighting for, and the effects in some cases of Bolshevik propaganda, have produced a low state of morale in the American forces. The men and officers feel that they are not accomplishing and cannot accomplish any useful objective in North Russia; they resent the treatment they have received from the British High Command, and urge that they be withdrawn immediately from North Russia. The peasants in North Russia, large numbers of whom were visited by our officers, are kindly and hospitable, particularly well-disposed towards the Americans, and have a high admiration for President Wilson whose picture was found in almost every home visited by him. This feeling however has been offset, in part at least, by the fact that American troops constitute the bulk of the actual fighting forces, a fact which has been taken advantage of by the Bolsheviks who in their propaganda...
Excerpt from “Situation Reports on the Efficiency and Morale of the AEF”:

It is also necessary to note that A, B, partly C, companies have lost at one time or other all of their kit and equipment and the men have not got sufficient razors, soap, towels etc. The company commanders complained bitterly of lack of effort on the part of the regiment headquarters and the supply company to replace lost articles and there is a very strong feeling among the men that the regiment commander and the headquarters staff leave it to the British headquarters to look after the American soldiers and are not making any efforts to provide for the special needs of the Americans.

During the time the first battalion is at the front they were visited only once by the colonel in command of the regiment and the men expected a great deal from that visit. They were however much disappointed by the talk he made to them as it did not explain what they [were] here for and he also said that he wanted [them] to understand that his work at Archangel was just as hard as theirs if not more so.

A clear statement of the reasons for which we have to remain and fight here would greatly help to improve the minds of the men, but apparently at the present time it is impossible to obtain one.
What Ails the A.N.R.E.F.? by R.S. Clark, Archangel, Russia (April – May, 1919):

For the purpose of discussing the subject of the ANREF I wish I were an outsider. As a member of that force many facts that I shall state will be frowned upon as being merely prejudiced opinion, even though the same statements might be readily enough accepted were they expressed by a well-informed civilian. On the other hand, however, it is plain that very few civilians have any means of becoming so conversant with morale conditions within the structure of the ANREF as has a member of that force itself. Perhaps the advantage outweighs the objections.

The military situation in North Russia today presents a seeming paradox: Here are American, Canadian, French, and British troops, allied for the prosecution of an active warfare, in time of peace; against an unrecognized though well-organized foe; on whom war has never been declared by any of the governments represented. Here they are, under the control of a single nation, Britain; gagged by iron censorship; carrying out a campaign concerning which remarkably little information is available to the outside world, even to those lands which have contributed the personnel. And with what result? Morale is at ebb tide. Companies and detachments mutiny from time to time, refusing to carry out orders unless demands are met. Discouragement, grumbling, and discontent are rampant. Mystification, ignorance, or actual misinformation is the lot of the enlisted man. The enemy has inflicted only slight losses upon him, but his morale, the backbone of any military organization, is shot to pieces. Why? Is it because the enlisted men are, as my own captain so aptly phrased it in the presence of the company “a lot of yellow bastards”? A thinking person will at once doubt the probability of the majority of any random group of the nationalities in question being out-and-out cowards. It is out of the question. The odds are a million to one against it. Let us rather see if there is not some evident working of cause and effect here. The purpose of this paper is to try to associate the proper causes with the corresponding results; to substantiate the proposition that the present state of affairs at Archangel and the various fronts, so far as the morale of the enlisted men is concerned, is only the natural working out of the scheme upon which the whole expedition has been run.

In the first place there are many things that may inspire the arms of the common soldier to deeds of valor. Suppose we examine some of them and see if they are operative in the ANREF.

1. The Nipponese soldier is inspired by a fanatical patriotism. The Emperor is to him a god, to fight and suffer for whom is glorious. His ancestors’ spirits hover over each battlefield, to die in whose presence and sight is the one honor most to be sought after. The cause matters not a bit. Nippon’s call is his chance for instant immortality. Now the American soldier’s patriotism is of a different sort. His pride in race and homeland is not a bit less, nor are his gratitude and love for his country any less real and constant. His is a thinking patriotism rather than a blindly believing one, and as such it is starved and stultified in the mysterious vapor of ignorance and lies with which every military movement in North Russia is befogged. Just how America is to benefit by the chastisement of a particular band of Russian Bolsheviks (or Socialists) is a matter which is officially denied discussion. If it is to the glory of America that Bolshevism be wiped out then a little education along that line would make of the American soldier in Russia a fighting machine ten times more formidable than ignorance has made him.

2. Again a soldier may be inspired by an active hatred of his foe. Under the spur of hatred the American Indian performed deeds of valor and bore his arms unflinchingly in the face of every extremity of war. Hatred of the Hun was no small factor upon the Western Front in the Great War, but in Northern Russia the Bolshevik appears merely as a half-starved and not unlikeable
fellow who frankly disavows any quarrel with America or Americans. He commandeers food and horses it is true, being in enemy country, but he spits no babies, shells no hospitals, murders no nurses. Rape is among his crimes, but in Russian eyes this is merely commandeering again. He merely takes without cash payment. First and last there is no great hatred for the Bolshevik in the rank and file of the American army.

3. The pioneer settler of the Middle West was a valiant fighter though not often a soldier. He fought to defend his home and loved ones against attack. Danger to these makes heroes of the veriest weaklings and avenging angels of the brave. Evidently, however, this particular prop of valor is absolutely lacking in the ANREF. We may as well forget it, entirely.

4. From the Middle Ages men have fought for the right to think, and having thought, for their convictions. Men, I say have fought for these, not generals nor kings, but men. The conviction that a severed Union meant National death made a million heroes in Civil War days. The conviction that the right to hold slaves was an unalienable one made a million more. But the enlisted man of our army in Russia is allowed no convictions political or moral concerning the Bolsheviks. Ignorance is the watchword, the cloak in which all purpose and intent of those in power is shrouded. Perhaps the most valorous and successful soldiers of history have been driven by the relentless fires of religious convictions. Under this spur a few hundred Saracens ravaged three continents in as many years, and spread the web of the great Byzantine Empire over a terror-stricken world, so that today the followers of Muhammed rival in point of numbers those of Christ himself. It was the rigid religious convictions under the dented helmets of Cromwell’s Roundheads that made the impossible come true when the triple rank of lowly-born pikemen bore unshaken the repeated shock of armoured horsemen, the flower of England’s nobility. Has religious conviction any part in our expedition? Absolutely none.

5. Alexander conquered the world, for at his back was an invincible host. Their invincibility lay to a large extent in the fact that their confidence in Alexander was unquestioning and absolute. With Alexander gone the world empire melted like all enveloping frost and almost as quickly. Confidence in a commander has won many a victory, and it is slow of establishment and requires several things for development; to wit:

6. Tried and successful leadership of men is necessary to confidence. The North Russian Expedition has been a farce from the start, every move a blunder. Pigheadedness, and lack of foresight characterize all tactics. Each rank wars with all the others. This scarcely inspires the confidence of the common soldier.

7. Honesty is essential in a leader who is to inspire confidence. The plans and intents of the whole expedition have from the very first been shrouded in a fabric of lies. After being sent to Archangel for the express purpose of guarding supplies, which did not exist, against the inroads of German forces, long since withdrawn, a few thousand men were posted on hundreds of miles of fronts, some two weeks journey from the base. Promised relief, none was sent. Post and press are under strict censorship, for though the Bolsheviks do not hold up mail steamers, the truth must not be allowed to leak out to America. Truth seems to be most feared of all things. The private soldier has been lied to and false rumors have been circulated until all are fed up on lies, and confidence in his officers is not part of the soldier’s creed.

8. Generosity in a leader invokes the love and confidence of soldiers, but the conduct of the officers of the North Russia Force is and has been the acme of selfishness. The belief in the
Divine Right of Officers seems to follow all ramifications of the military. A second lieutenant stationed at a tiny village on one “front” occupies two warm rooms in the best house. His 30 “other ranks” occupy one room in each of the other two houses. The lieutenant has an orderly and oftentimes a cook as well to attend to his personal comfort, while the men’s mess is cooked on a field range under an open shed, and this is winter in Russia. One company is quartered in an old prison barracks, cold and leaky and sure to be flooded by the spring rise of the Dvina. The men were allowed three days in which to make these filthy, vermin infested, ramshackle, summer prison huts into winter quarters for Americans in Russia. A detail of carpenters, however, worked for weeks upon the construction of snug quarters for the 6 officers of the company, quarters including kitchen, sitting room, private bedrooms, and bath and latrine. While an enlisted man can buy only a very limited “ration” at the NACB canteen, an officer can get as much and as often as he wishes. The same is true to a smaller degree at every YMCA canteen. The Red Cross seemingly is run principally for the officers of the expedition. The enlisted man who applies is told they are just out. While a company of 200 men receives, after yards of tape are wound, a violin, free of cost, from the Red Cross, the six officers of that same company receive violin, banjo, mandolin, and concertina as their share of the issue. Selfishness is the keynote of the musical comedy ANREF, and respect and confidence in leaders is not to be thus instilled.

Fairness, no less than honesty, begets new confidence. Democracy in a leader is essential to the trust of American soldiers. The American soldier sincerely believes that he is “just as good as the next fellow, and a wee bit better.” He does not like the idea of serving under English officers, carrying out English plans for English purposes on English rations dealt out by English ASC. Because of this implied inferiority to Britons there has grown up a live enmity between English and Americans. For the most part the few English troops and the many English NCOs and officers are stationed at Archangel or some of the lesser bases of supplies, while Americans, French, and Canadians do the actual fighting and patrol work at the fronts. Always the English handle the supplies, and hold the reins of power, while the other allied nationalities handle the machine guns and artillery and hold the attention of the enemy. It is a bitter pill on the tongue of Americanism and Americanism is not entirely to be blamed for gagging at it. No man who feels himself the victim of unjust discriminations will do his best for the perpetrators thereof—even in the army.

It is due to the fact that each of the several conditions favorable to good and valiant conduct of a soldier, as named above, are signally lacking in the NREF that the morale of that force is at present so low. There is nothing mysterious about the matter. A given effect is not produced, simply because no force or influence is at work to produce it. A regimental order cannot make watermelons grow in a desert unless somebody irrigates, and army morale, though a hardy plant when well rooted, will no more thrive than watermelons upon the slender sustenance of a bare show of authority. It seems ridiculous that a thinking Majesty should expect it, yet such was evidently the expectation of the Rulers of the United Kingdom, and care was taken that those of the United States should learn very little about the matter.

So much of disillusionment has fallen to the lot of the American soldier in Russia that he may perhaps be pardoned for referring still to believe all he is told. The knowledge, forced upon him, that so much of the sacrifice that the folks are making is utterly wasted so far as he is concerned might be expected to make him rather a doubter. At the fronts, in the face of the enemy, no white feather has been shown – war was advertised as hell and as such he accepts it. But he was told of a cause to fight for, of honors to be won, wrong to be righted; courageous
officers to be followed into battle, a stern life of high ideals, self-sacrifice, and clean and upright manliness to be lived for the sake of Democracy with a capital D. But here is no cause at all, only a foggy mystery of British orders. Here are no honors to be won, but only shame and humiliation undreamed of at home to be reaped as the reward of service. Here are no wrongs being righted for a grateful people. Here is merely capital being protected by the infliction of fresh new wrongs upon helpless ones and the juggling of paper money in a cloud of lies. Here are very very few officers whom their men consider worthy of being followed into battle. Here on the other hand are scores of officers (mostly British but not all by any means) who are perjured again and again, liars, whore-mongers, booze-fighters, who absolutely fear to venture near the front, much less under fire, knowing certainly that a well deserved bullet in the back would be the messenger of justice and of death upon their first appearance. Here are no high ideals, but moral degradation and moral prostitution. Here is no self-sacrifice, but a slavish service of British command in general as manifested by the gilded aristocracy of British and American officers in particular. Here is no incentive to clean and upright manliness, but rather the downward influence of temptation in every form backed up by the repeated disappointments, discouragements, and disillusionments. Here are doubt and settling helplessness. Here are ever increasing thievery, lying, hatred, mutiny. Many and bitter are the pills that the American soldier in Russia has to swallow, and of these not the least is that the folks at home don’t know and can’t know what the conditions here are. British censorship sits grinning on the safety valve and the steam pressure is heavier than the world suspects. Meanwhile the fog of official vagueness and deceit looks like a normal exhaust and doubtless people at home will throw up their hands in holy horror at the thought of mutiny among the Soldier of Democracy. Need more be added? Cannot the evil morale of the ANREF now be explained upon other grounds than those of yellowness and bastardy? Need one be told that this paper had to be sneaked out of Russia? That its discovery would mean a term in Leavenworth to the writer? If one more thing be wanted, here it is: We Americans serving the King and his cane-swinging cohorts here in Russia are in truth a flagless army. Archangel in gala rig flaunts hundreds of Russian flags, scores of British flags, but only here and there solitary specimens of Old Glory. American flags are in some way objectionable to our masters, and hence are unobtainable. The Supply Co. of the 339th Inf. Showed the Stars and Stripes over its barracks. A British officer, armed with a technicality once requested its removal but was told to “Come and take it, damn you.” The bluff stuck and the solitary flag remains, but so does the shame of its pitiful solitariness. The seemingly forgotten ANREF serves without honor; without a cause; without inspiration; without competent officers; without truth; without relief; without a flag. God pity those who are to blame. Don’t make yourself one of them by supinely doubting these words.
For the purpose of discarding the subject of the C.G.H.F. I think I were an outsider. As a member of that force many facts that shall state will be confirmed upon as being merely prejudiced opinions, even though the same statements might be readily enough accepted were they expressed by a well-informed civilian. On the other hand, however, it is plain that very few civilians have any means of becoming so conversant with morale conditions within the structure of the C.G.H.F as has a member of that force itself. Perhaps the advantage outweighs the objections.

The military situation in North Russia today presents a seeming paradox: Here are American, Canadian, French, and British troops, allied for...
the prosecution of an active warfare; in time I fear; against an
unrecognized though well-organized foe? On whom was her never
been declared by any of the governments represented. Here they are, under
the control of a single nation, at least;
pressed by alien censorship, carrying out a campaign concerning which
remarkably little information is available
to the outside world, even to those funds
which have contributed the personnel.
And with what result? Morale is
at its low. Compliments and encouragement by
mutinying from time to time refusing to carry out orders; inadequate supplies are met;
Enormity, smuggling and discontent are rampant.
Militarization, ignorance, or actual misinformation are the lot of
the enlisted man. The enemy has
inflicted what might have been a short
hit upon the backbone of any military
organization, in what is termed
Why? Is it because the enlisted
man are as my own captain so aptly
phrased it in the presence of the Weekly
company, a lot of yellow bastards? A
thinking person will at once doubt
the probability of the majorities of
any random group, if it is in question, being set against rewards.
It is out of the question. The odds are a
million to one against it. Yet no matter
one of these is not some evident working
force and effort here. The purpose
of this paper is to try to associate this
paper with the corresponding results to substantiate the proposition
that the present state of affairs is
unworthy and the current so far as
the morale of the enlisted man is
considered, is only the natural working
out of the scheme upon which the
whole expedition has been put.
In the first place there are many things that may impress the mind of the common soldier, to deeds of valor. Suppose we examine some of them and see if they are operative in the MW.

The Japanese soldier is inspired by a devotion to his country. The Japanese is to him a god, to fight and die for whom is glorious. His ancestors' spirits hover over each battle field, to give him moral support and resolve in the hour of his need to be sought after. The same matter a lot of Japanese call in his charge for constant immortality. Now the American soldier's patriotism is of a different sort. His race in race, and developed not a lot lies, nor are his gratitude and love for his country any less real and constant. He is a thinking patriot rather than a blindly believing one, and as such, it is trained and justified in the operations.

The phrase of ignorance and love with which every military moment in North Russia is stigmatized is to be lost by the shortcoming of a particular kind of Russian bolshevik (socialists) in a matter which is officially denied discussion. It is in to the glory of America that bolshevik has accepted it and seen a little education along that line would make of the American soldier. Russia a fighting machine the team more for imbecile than ignorance has made him.

2. Again a soldier may be inspired by an active hatred of his foe. Under the pressure of hatred the American soldier performed deeds of valor and killed his enemy unmercifully in the face of every extremity of war. Hatred of the foe was an almost greater source of the Western Front in the Great War.
POLAR BEARS, COLD WAR, AND QUESTIONS OF DUTY

3/2/7

In western Europe the Bolsheviks appear merely as half-starved and most unlikely fellows who frankly disavow any quarrel with America or America. The commandments post and bear it in true, bring an enemy country, but he repels me neither, neither the bolshevik, nor modern no success. Hope is among his science, but in Russian eyes, just is merely commanding against. He merely can without rank appoint.
First and last there was no great hatred for the bolshevik in the rank and file of the American army.

3.

The former settler of the Middle West was a silent fighter through not often a leader. He fought to defend his home and loved ones against attack.

3/8/7

This particular page of volume is absolutely lacking in the AMHF. We may as well forget it, entirely.

4. From the Middle ages men have fought for the right I think and having thought for their convictions.

Men, I may have fought for these, not because were things, but men. The conviction that a social union meant National death made a million heroes in civil war days. The conviction that the right to hold places was an unchangeable one made a million more. But the enlisted men of our army in Russia is allowed one convictions political or moral concerning the bolshevik.

Ignorance in the watered, the black on which all finish and extent I there is power is standed. Perhaps the most valiant and successful soldiers of history have
POLAR BEARS, COLD WAR, AND QUESTIONS OF DUTY

6. Tried and successful leadership of men is necessary to confidence. The North Russian Expedition has been a force from the start, even more a Crusader. Schweitzer, and lack of foresight characterizes all tactics. Each rank was with all the others. This scarcely inspires the confidence of the common soldier.

7. Authority is essential in a leader who is to inspire confidence. The plans and actions of the whole expedition have from the very first been blown
Preliminary pages have been include as a courtesy. The religious service, the Divine Liturgy, is to be celebrated by the Russian church. The service is not to be conducted in the presence of the Military.

A second lieutenant stationed at a tiny village in one front occupies two warm rooms in the best house. He and another soldier occupy one room in each of the other two houses. The Lieutenant has an orderly and often attends to his personal comfort, while the orderly cooks in a field kitchen under an open shed, and this is winter in Russia.

One company is quartered in an old prison barracks. Cold and rocky and sure to be flooded by the spring river of the Dnieper. The men were allowed three days in which to make them fit for service, with some infected, scrawny huts into which quarters for American men, Russian.
POLAR BEARS, COLD WAR, AND QUESTIONS OF DUTY | MORALE – DOCUMENT F

A letter of a soldier who is working for weeks upon the construction of a new quarters for the 6 officers of the company, quarters including kitchen, sitting room, private bedrooms, and both and latrine. While an enlisted man can try only a very limited “station” at the YMCA, an officer can get as much and longer and so on.

The same is true to a small degree at every YMCA, canton. The Red Cross, seemingly, is more pronounced for the officers of the instruction. The enlisted man who applies is told they are first cut. With a company of 500 men, success after years of effort is unusual. A violin, free of cost, from the Red Cross, the six officers of that same company receive violin, banjo, mandolin and concertina as their place of the season.
The actual fighting and forward work at the front. Always the English handle the supplies and hold the rear of the same, while the other Allied nations handle the machine guns and artillery and hold the attention of the enemy. It is a better pill in the tongue of an American or a Canadian or a Frenchman, not entirely to be blamed for gaping at it. No man who feels himself the victim of economic discrimination will do his best for the perpetrator thereof—even in the army.

It is due to the fact that each of the several conditions favorable to good and valiant conduct of a soldier, as named above, are actually lacking in the N.E.F. that the morale of that force is at present so low. There is nothing mysterious about the matter. A given effect is not produced, simply because no force or influence is at work to produce it. A regimental order cannot make watermelons grow in a desert unless somebody irrigates and ponders melons, though it may plant them and water them; will not more thrive than watermelons upon the slender sustenance of a bare show of authority. It seems incredible that a thinking Majority should accept it, yet such was evidently the expectation of the leaders of the United Kingdom, and care was taken that those of the United States should learn very little about the matter.

As much I disapprove her folly, to the lot of the American soldier in Europe, that he may perhaps be pardoned for assuming still to believe all he is told. The knowledge forced upon him, that so much of the sacrifices that the folks at home are making is utterly
POLAR BEARS, COLD WAR, AND QUESTIONS OF DUTY | MORALE – DOCUMENT F

3/8/17

warred as far as he is concerned might be expected to make him rather a doubtful. At the front, in the face of the enemy, no white feature has been shown — war was advertised as hell and as such he accepts it. But he was told it a chance to fight for, to honor to do, wrong to be righted, courage to be followed, battle to stern life, high ideals, self-sacrifice, and clean cut rightness mantains to be lived for the sake of Democracy with a capital D. But there is no chance at all, only a foggy mystery of British soldiers. Here are no heroes to be won, but only shame and humiliation. In my mind I at home to be useful in the service. Here are no wrongs being righted for a grateful people. Here are merely capital being protected by the

3/9/18

reflection of a fresh new wrong. Helpless, yes, but the fighting is not done yet. Merry home song a bland of lies. Here are very few officers whom their men consider worthy of being followed into battle. Here on the other hand are scores of heroes (mostly British, but not all of them men) who are fighting again and again, brave, sincere, honest. Do not forget, the absolutely fear to venture near the front, much less under fire. Knowing that a well armed soldier in the back would be the messenger of truth and of death upon their first appearance. Here are no high ideals, no moral degradation. Here is as self-indulgence, but a clear service of British command in general or manipulated by the gilded ancestry. British & American officers in particular. Here is no incentive
MORALE – DOCUMENT F

3/9/39

Mad more be added? Cannot the sole morale of the 1939/47 war be explained upon other grounds than those of yellowmen and Pentangies? Need one be told that that paper should be rescued out of Russia? That its discovery would mean a turn in Scandinavia to the writer?

If more than one be wanted, here it is:

We Americans acquiring the King and his trembling, Herbert, here in Russia are in truth a flagging army. Battered in gold by flanks hundreds of Russian fliers, scores of British fliers but long here and their solitary specimen is all joy. America here in some way obstructed to our motion and hence are unobtainable. The struggle of the 2592 had showed the Stasi fliers over its territory. A British flier armed with a technicality was engaged in...
Silver Parrish Diary (May 1919):

Sunday

Sighted gun boat coming up river bound for Tolgas – place that we held at a great cost of life for months and that the Russia Regulars have given to the Bolos. There is some talk of us going up to help retake the place. This life is just one damn thing after another after being up here fighting these people I will be ashamed to look a union man in the face for the way they have been treated by their government. The Cozzacks is a dirty crime. The majority of the people here are in [?] with the Bolo and I don’t blame them in fact I am 9/10 Bolo myself and they all call me the Bolo leader and my platoon the Bolo platoon because every man in my platoon signed that petition protesting against conditions and fighting Bolo after the Germans had quit. But we have got the best fighting record of any platoon in the battalion.

Resolution #1
To the commanding officer of Archangel district.
We the undersigned firmly resolve that we demand relief not later than March 15th 1919. After this date we [?] refuse to advance on the Bolo lines including [?] and in view of the fact that our object in Russia has been accomplished and having acquitted ourselves by doing everything that was in our power and was asked of us. We after six months of diligent and uncomplaining sacrifice after serious debate arrive at this conclusion and it is not considered unpatriotic to the US by us. In view of this be it that the interests and honor of the USA are not at stake and that we have accomplished the defeat of the Germans which was our mission and whereas further activity means interference in the affairs of the Russian people with whom we have no quarrel. We do hereby solemnly pledge ourselves to uphold the principles herein states and to cease all activities on and after the above mentioned date.

[Signatures on following pages:]
3rd Squad,
Carl Babys, Nebraska. 26409477
Burgoyne St, Buffalo, N.Y.
Fred, Wm., St. Louis.
Klingens, El. J.
G. G. Masterson.

1st Squad,
Cpl. William. Anderson. 2056126
Barry, J. J.

Pvt. Harry. Wolzlaus, 2951809
W. 8, North St, Cadillac, Mich.

Edward. V. St. Louis.

2059164

2nd Squad,
Pvt. J. Anderson. 2054443

2938133

Pvt. Andrew. Fisher. 2911748

July 6, 1919

From: Colonel J.A. Ruggles, Military Attache, Archangel
To: Director of Military Intelligence, War Department, Washington

The morale of the American troops… underwent a steady decline after the signing of the armistice. The troops wanted to know why they were called upon here after the fighting had ceased on the Western Front’ they stated that they were drafted to fight Germany, not the Bolsheviks; that we had never declared war on the Bolsheviks; that they had been sent here to guard supplies and not to carry on an aggressive warfare; that after the signing of the armistice with Germany their job was finished and if the government wanted them to stay on and fight Bolshevism it should say so and announce some definite policy regarding Russia.

...[T]he first instance of a mutinous spirit shown by American troops occurred about the last of February at Tulgas, where Company B, 339th Infantry was at that time stationed. I am informed that a petition was circulated among the men to the effect that the signers, after March 15th, would refuse to stand sentry duty and would not go out on any further patrols.

The principal grievance of the men at that time seemed to be that they were insufficiently protected by artillery; that they had been told that the ice on the river would begin to break about March 15th and they did not care to be caught like rats in a hole to be slaughtered by Bolshevik gunboats.
duty; that they had been sent to Russia for garrison duty and that if the British government wanted to carry on a war in Russia they should send out men physically able to do the job.

(e) Before our evacuation of Kita, on the Vaga, Major Hyde, in command of the 65th Battery, Canadian Field Artillery, sent to Morjegorskaya for a section of his artillery, commanded by Lieutenant Roberta, to proceed to Kita to relieve one of the two sections then stationed there. The Morjegorskaya section refused to obey the order. Major Hyde, upon hearing of their refusal, went immediately to Morjegorskaya and talked with the men personally. They still refused to obey his order. Then Colonel Chairman arrived and talked with the men, but they still refused to go to the front. Colonel Chairman then threatened to court-martial the entire section, but even that seemed to have no effect upon them. Meanwhile, a part of one of the artillery sections from Kita was sent to Morjegorskaya to get the guns and equipment belonging to the mutinous section. Upon their arrival at Morjegorskaya they refused to speak to the mutineers or associate with them in any way, which action so shamed the latter that they asked to be allowed to reconsider their action and stated that they would go to the front. Their request was granted and they later went to the front.

So far as I can learn, no action was taken against any of the men. I am not informed just why these men refused to go to the front, except that they had had a long period of duty on the Solotkoe front and had been relieved only a short time before.

(f) On March 24th, after our unsuccessful attempt to take Bolshe Ozerki, the British and American sergeants got together and agreed that, if they were ordered to make a further attack, they would refuse to go into action. They told Mr. Craig of the Y. M. C. A. of their decision. The attack at that time was called off so that they did not have an opportunity to put their threat into force.

5. American.

(a) The morale of the American troops likewise underwent a steady decline after the signing of the
Excerpts from Archangel: The American War with Russia by John Cudahy (1924):

But there were no such reflections to sustain the soldier in Russia. The Armistice came, and he remembers the day as one of sanguinary battle, when his dwindling number suffered further grievous losses, and he was sniped at, stormed with shrapnel and shaken by high explosive shells. He heard of the cessation of blood-letting in France and Belgium, but for many desolate, despairing months, he stood to his guns, witnessing his comrades killed and mutilated, the wounded lying in crude, dirty huts, makeshifts of dressing stations, then in sledges, dragged many excruciating miles over the snow to the rear, where often they go little better attention than at the front lines. He knew his physical strength was failing under the unrelieved monotony of the Arctic exploration ration; he saw others with scabies and disgusting diseases of malnutrition, and wondered how long before he too would be in the same way. He felt his sanity reeling in the short-lived, murky, winter days, the ever encircling menace of impending disaster and annihilation. He asked his officers why he fought, and why he was facing an enemy vastly superior to him in strength and equipment and armament, and why he was separated from his family and home and the ways of life, and when the end would come. But his officers were silent under this inquisition. They asked the same questions themselves, and got no reply.

…As the soldiers, with no keen appetite for the heartless job, cast the peasants out of the homes where they had lived… the torch was set to their houses… Outside now, some of the women ran about, aimlessly, like stampeded sheep; others sat upon hand fashioned crates, wherein they had hastily flung their most cherished treasures, and abandoned themselves to a paroxysm of weeping despair; while the children shrieked stridently…

With the Americans, at least, there remained no shred of illusion…. Germany was never concerned with Archangel. There was no evidence of German participation in the campaign; no evidence that our petty hostilities with the Bolsheviks had ever benefited… the Western theater.

We had waged war upon Russia. Whether willfully or unwillingly, our country had engaged in an unprovoked intensive, inglorious, little armed conflict which had ended in disaster and disgrace…

…[T]here was not a man in the ranks who did not sense the disgrace in our ignoble desertion, there was not an American officer who would not have chosen to have left his bones bleaching white beneath Archangel snows, than been a living witness to the ignominious way in which his country quit and slunk away.

Thus ended America’s share of the war with Russia…. No peace was ever made with Russia, as no state of war had ever been recognized, and the legalists might well contend that all who engaged in it are open to indictment for manslaughter, for the enterprise will always remain a depraved one with status of a freebooters’ excursion.

Protest Petitions Signed (2-4-1919):

Protesting keeping American troop[s] [in] northern Russia, confronted by a force of bolsheviki many times their number, nearly 2,000 fathers and mothers, brothers and sisters and friends of the Detroiter ‘over there’ crowded Trinity church to capacity Monday night. Scores were turned away.

Petitions bearing signatures of relatives of Detroit soldiers and sympathizers with efforts to have the troops recalled or reinforced will be sent to [C]ongress. The petitions were put in circulation and signed at the meeting.

**PETITION TO**

**CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

FIRST, in making this our petition, we do hereby affirm our unswerving loyalty to the Country and Government of the United States of America, and do hereby express our willingness to abide by the acts of the constituted authorities should this petition be either tabulated or denied. This petition we, make in manner following:

BELIEVING from the sifting of evidence that the American Units in North Russia not only are suffering incredible hardships, but are in grave danger at the hands of an overwhelming and conscienceless enemy, and

ALSO BELIEVING that the Archangel expedition, if it ever had a valid excuse, cannot now be justified, neither on the grounds of humanity nor of military expedience, and

ALSO BELIEVING that now the war is practically if not technically over there exists no patriotic reason why our American soldiers in North Russia should not have at least an equal chance for their lives with other American soldiers,

WE, THE UNDERSIGNED, THEREFORE, RESPECTFULLY PETITION for the withdrawal of the American Soldiers from the entire country of North Russia and their return to the authority of their own officers and the War Department of the United States of America; or failing this, we urge that they be properly housed, fed, clothed, munitioned, and given proper hospital facilities and reinforcements without delay.

FURTHERMORE in appending our signatures to this petition we do jointly and severally declare that in the most solemn manner that we have no political party to serve in the premises; but that we do make and constitute this our petition with the sole desire of releasing our American soldiers from an ambiguous, intolerable, and entirely un-American situation in which death is the least among many evils.

Dated at Detroit, Michigan, this __________ day of ________ in the year of our Lord 1919.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
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<tr>
<td>Mrs. Frank Peter</td>
<td>99 Yates Ave</td>
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<td>Mrs. Paul Larcher</td>
<td>867 E. 10th St</td>
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<td>Mrs. Clara Larcher</td>
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<td>Mrs. Jules B. Larcher</td>
<td>124 E. 21st St</td>
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<td>John H. Lawson</td>
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<td>John Adams</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paul McFarlane</td>
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<tr>
<td>George Brown</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jennifer Jones</td>
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<td>David Williams</td>
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That American “Mutiny” in Russia (7-12-19):

One of the officers admitted to me he had the feeling all day that the whole expedition was done for. “It seemed to me we had become a tiny American force beleaguered on every side by our supposed friends as well as by tens of thousands of Bolsheviki.”

Added to these facts the temperature of fifty below zero which prevailed that day, and it would seem there was some cause for these men to ask question as to the why and wherefore of their situation.

There were two other elements which the officers of the expedition say had even more effect. The first was the agitation in the United States over the Russian question…. The men had… received also newspaper clippings… and letters from their parents asking why the men did not ask [about why they were in Russia].

The second element was that Americans were commanded by British officers…. It is not surprising that… they resented the situation.

Archangel in Winter Makes No Hit With Michigan Troops:

…[T]he whole state of Michigan objected, in indignation meetings and resolutions of protest, against the dangers and deprivations that were said to threaten their troops in North Russia…. “I don’t know of any worse place in the world than Archangel,” writes Sergt. Theodore J. Kolbe, of Detroit… and [he was] lyrical in dispraise of Archangelic charms:

It’s the land of the infernal odor,
The land of the national smell,
The average United States soldier
Would rather be quartered in L.

Why Don't They Send You Home! (Bolshevik Propaganda, 1919):

WHY DON'T THEY SEND YOU HOME!

To the American and British Soldiers:

Did you ever stop to think why they don't send you home?

The war is over. Armistice is concluded. Peace negotiations are already being conducted. Months have already elapsed since the great slaughter has stopped.

Millions of soldiers — French, British, American, are returning home from the battlefields. Millions of prisoners are returning home from prison. This is a time of joy and happiness for thousands of humble homes—the boys are coming back! Hundreds of ships are carrying American boys in khaki from the Western front back to the shores of Columbia.

Why, then, don't they let you go home?

"Sweet Home" is waiting for you. Those whom you love are waiting for you. Your wives and children, your sisters and sweethearts are waiting for you. Your gray, old dear mothers are waiting for you.

Are they waiting in vain?

Your mother is asking every newcomer from the front: "Where is my boy?" "Don't know! Somewhere in the steppes of Russia."

What are you doing here, "somewhere in Russia?" What do they want you here for?

The war is over because there is nothing left to fight for, and nothing to fight against.

They have been telling you that this was a war against German autocracy, against German imperialism, against kaiserism. But now there is no more kaiserism, there is no more autocracy. The German workers have arisen in revolt — and they have themselves defeated kaiserism. Themselves! — without the help of British and American troops. There is no more imperialism in Germany. The kaiser and the cruel "war-lords" have fled. Germany, like Russia, is now the land of revolution.

Germany, like Russia, will be governed not by a bunch of cruel masters, but by the people, by revolutionary workers.

Is it true that you have been fighting for freedom and democracy? If this was true you would have been sent home on the very day the German revolution broke out. But instead of home you are sent to the steppes of Russia. Why?

Because this is not a war for Freedom. This is not a war for Democracy, but against Democracy....

You are here to fight against Democracy and Freedom. You are here to fight against the Russian workers and poor peasants.

You are going to shed your blood and our blood for the benefit of the Allied plutocrats, for the benefit of the Rockefeller-Morgan kaiserism.

We don't want war. We want peace with you American and British fellow-workers! Don't you want peace with us? Don't you want to go home?

The war is over, but a new war is starting. This new war is the class war. The oppressed of all countries are rising against the oppressors, because the war has brought so much distress and so
much sufferings to the poor that they can suffer no longer. Do you realize that you are shedding your blood in the interests of the oppressors and not of the oppressed? Do you realize that you are to defend oppression and exploitation and that you are to give your very lives for the interests of those who are now, after the fall of the Kaiser, the only kaisers in the world?

Do you want to sacrifice your lives in order that the capitalists may obtain a greater hold on our class, the workers? Of course not!

Demand to go home. Hold meetings in your regiments, form Soldiers' Councils, and force your demands on your governments and your officers. If you are convinced in the justness of the cause of labor then come over to our side and we will give you a hearty welcome into the ranks of those who are fighting for the emancipation of labor.

Why Don’t They Return You Home (Bolshevik Propaganda, 1919):

WHY DON’T YOU RETURN” HOME To the American and British Soldiers:

Comrades.— The war is over, why are you not returning home? The people in England and America went nearly mad with joy when the long hoped for peace at last arrived. But why is there no peace for you, and for us? President Wilson and his colleagues are in Europe, the other Allied governments have also appointed their delegates, and soon the Peace Conference will assemble. But in the meantime you are still condemned to fight and die, and war with all its horrors is raging in Russia.

For many long, weary agonizing months, perhaps years, your old folks, your wives, your little ones have been overwhelmed with anxiety about you. Now in their innocence their anxiety has been turned into joyful expectation of your return. Can you not picture them—every knock, every footstep they hear makes their hearts leap in the belief that it is someone bringing tidings of your homecoming. But your dear ones will wait in vain. Your masters continue to drive you through the valley of death, and you do not know, but that your bodies may rot in the mud and blood of the battlefield. Don't you want to mingle with your loved ones again?

The war is over. Why don't you go home?

For over four years your governments have kept you at war, and have condemned millions of your fellow citizens to death, and millions more to a fate worse than death. You made these fearful sacrifices for what you were led to believe to be the defense of Europe against the domination of the kaiser, and once and for all to relieve the world from the crushing burden of armaments; from the menace of Prussian militarism.

Well, this menace is removed. Prussian militarism is crushed. The kaiser is a fugitive. The German workers have risen in revolt and have delivered a death blow to the power of the reactionary Junker class.

Why, then, are you still fighting? Above all, why are you in Russia?

Is this worth dying for? Do you really desire to bleed and die in order that capitalism may continue? Say no!

Form Soldiers' Councils in each regiment, and demand of your governments, demand of your officers to be sent home. Refuse to shoot your fellow workers in Russia—refuse to crush our workers' revolution.
XIX
CONCERNING MILITARY INTERVENTION

During the first half of 1918 there was considerable discussion in America of the proposed military intervention in Russia. Mr. Roosevelt favored it—insisted upon it. Mr. Wilson was understood to be opposed to it, this understanding resting on the general interpretation of his utterances. The debate, widespread, was before the fact. Now that the fact is accomplished we may well look into the results.

The weak fashion in which we went into the enterprise has given rise to the theory in some quarters that it will be claimed that we did not go into it at all. If an armistice had been declared in Russia on November 11, or if America had then notified the Bolsheviks that we had no military motives there, the affair could well have been charged up to the war with Germany, and we might well claim that we had had no serious intention of interfering in the affairs of Russia. But the armistice did not even think of Russia. We were fighting a separate war there. We in Russia were not even notified officially that there was an armistice. We heard about it, and wondered where we came in. It was after November 11 that most of our fighting took place and most of our casualties were suffered. Not until March were we promised that we should be taken home in the spring, and then no intimation was given us that America was to withdraw. Rumors were industriously circulated giving the impression that other Americans were on their way to take our places, and not until our men were actually away did our “information” permit us to realize that America had withdrawn from the expedition.

We intervened. We undertook to crush Bolshevism in Russia. We sent a military and
FIGHTING WITHOUT A WAR

naval expedition there. We organized a civil war there. It was unsuccessful. America lost a few men, England more, Russia many more. How much more Russia suffered is not yet written. America withdrew her troops. France, Serbia, Italy withdrew theirs. England reluctantly withdraws hers.

Let us consider what this expedition meant to our own men. They were only a few thousand men, to be sure, and their little event was so much smaller than the big thing in France that it was naturally even necessarily overlooked. Because I was with them, however, I know that it was a big thing their government made them do. The men in France had faith in their cause. The men in Russia had none. Over and over again our men in Russia have argued with me that while we were fighting for freedom in France we were fighting to kill it in Russia. Some said we were fighting for the capitalists of England and France, others declared that the Bolsheviks were more right than wrong, and everybody felt that our government had made a great mistake and that a life lost there was a life worse than thrown away. In this frame of mind American boys went through all the dangers and privations and sufferings of a difficult all-winter campaign and some of them went to their last battles. Statistically it is a little thing, if you must measure everything by statistics, but I have been made to feel how terribly great a thing was the death of one man who as I held his hand cursed the fate that made him die in a fight for which he had no heart.

It was a high degree of sportsmanship that enabled these men to see it through. If Mr. Wilson told his colleagues at Paris that “if” American troops were sent to Russia they would mutiny he might have based his opinion on information as to what American troops in Russia had already said on that particular subject.

It is difficult to imagine a more unmoral...
situation than that of an army fighting without a sense of function and against its sense of right, but this is what military intervention in Russia imposed on a small army of Americans.

I can testify of my personal knowledge that this was equally true of Canadian and British soldiers. I have heard that it was true of the French, the Italians, and the Serbians.

These men are all home now with their grievance. Few of them are proud of the expedition, or glad they had a part in it, or grateful to their country for its support, or willing to go again. Military intervention has been a tragedy in their lives and was an injustice to them such as no government may with impunity impose on its citizens.

We may not easily estimate the harm that military intervention has done in the lowering of our standards of national rights and in devitalizing our ideals of international relations. The precedent that has been established, however, is most unfortunate and may in the future be used to strengthen the hands of some one who may be trying to lead us into a more serious error of the same sort. I must, moreover, say that this enterprise has done considerable harm to the most important friendship in the world—that of England and America—as far as so great a thing could be affected by the few thousands of men who were directly engaged in the expedition. Our governments do not know about this, of course, but the men know. No thoughtful person could hear these men of either nation talk about the other nation without seeing the awfulness of the thing that has been done. It is not at all similar to the attitude of the soldier who knew the British in France, nor to his disillusionment about the French. It is very much worse. It is enmity. And it is clear to me that it is directly due to the fact that our men had to fight in a bad cause, with unwilling minds, beclouded consciences, and rebellious hearts.

Again I do not know how much our partici-
Fighting Without a War

Ponation in this affair has vitiated the faith of small nations in our disinterested friendship for the weak. We may hope that the nations of South America have not taken the Russian campaign to heart as seriously as have the small nations of Europe. Whatever result our military intervention in Russia has had upon this faith, however, those of us who have been in Russia know that it has had a profound effect upon the Russian people. We have not destroyed their faith in us. One mistake could not do that. But we have disillusioned many of them concerning the soundness of our judgment if not the purity of our motives, and they will hereafter, I think, look carefully into our alliances before trusting themselves utterly to our guidance.

Having got into a bad job the governments found it expedient to suppress news, to manipulate news, and even to manufacture a little.

Whether we have actually prolonged Lenin’s tenure of office and Trotsky’s reign in power

Military Intervention

we cannot of course know. But this is quite conceivable, and they are still in office and in power two years after the November revolution. We know that the armed barrier that we have built around them and forced them to build in front of us has prevented us from reaching them with any of the more convincing proofs of our “friendly purpose” than the shrapnel and h.e. we have managed to get over into their lines. The business men and educators and engineers and uplifters that we were going to send have had to wait while we undertook to settle Russian turmoil by making more turmoil.

We organized civil war in Russia. The Russians were not fighting the Bolsheviki—not our way. They did not want to fight them—in our way. We made them. We conscripted them to fight for their own freedom. It was difficult, but we had our army there and the army made the peasant patriotic—our way.

The Russian hates conscription; but what
were we to do? If he wouldn’t fight voluntarily he was a damned Bolshevik and must be made to. And so, as ever, one thing leads to another—especially when we are not quite clear that the one thing is a right thing. The conscripted Russians who rebelled against us and went over to the Bolsheviks were of course a small proportion of the whole. All sorts of mixed motives and confused judgments and conflicting loyalties entered into the situation, but one thing clearly emerged. This was civil war. Every man’s hand is set against his neighbor. And now as we confess the futility of our intervention and evacuate, the evil harvest is to be reaped. No peasant can escape it. No woman or child can escape it. Suspicion, retribution, tale-bearing, jealousy, hatred of Russian for Russian is the harvest our intervention has left behind it.

And if as happened far too frequently, a man’s batch of ancient letters that came after weeks of waiting, contained a brace of scented but whining epistles from the girl he had left behind him and perhaps a third one from a man friend who told how that same girl was running about with a slacker who had a fifteen-dollar a day job, the man had to be a jewel and a philosopher not to become bitter. And a bitter man deteriorates as a soldier.

To the credit of our veterans who were in North Russia let it be said that comparatively very few of them wrote sob-stuff home. They knew it was hard enough for the folks anyway, and it did themselves no good either. The imaginative “Scoops” among the cub reporters and the violently inflamed imaginations and utterances of partisan politicians seeking to puff their political sails with stories of hardships of our men in North Russia, all these and many other very well-meaning people were doing much to aggravate the fears and sufferings of the people at home. Many a doughboy at the front sighed wearily and shook his head doubtfully over the mess of sob-stuff that came uncensored from the States. He sent costly cablegrams to his loved ones at home to assure them that he was safe and not “sleeping in water forty degrees below zero” and so forth.

Not only did the screeching press articles and the roars of certain congressmen keep the homefolks in perpetual agony over the soldiers in Russia, but the reports of the same that filtered in through the mails to our front line campfires and Archangel comfortable billets caused trouble and heartburnings among the men. It seems incredible how much of it the men fell for. But seeing it in their own home paper, many of the men actually believed tales that when told in camp were laughed off as plain scandalous rumor.

War is not fought in a comfortable parlor or club-room, but some of the tales which slipped through the censor from spineless cry-babies in our ranks of high and low rank, and were published in the States and then in clippings found their way back to North Russia, lamented the fact of the handship of war in such insidious manner as to furnish the most formidable foe to morale with which the troops had to cope while in Russia. The Americans only laughed at Bolshevik propaganda which they clearly saw through. To the statement that the Reds would bring a million rifles against Archangel they only replied, “Let ’em come, the thicker grass the heavier the swath.”
But when a man’s own home paper printed the same story of the million men advancing on Archangel with bloody bayonets fixed, and told of the horrible hardships the soldier endured—and many of them were indeed severe hardships although most of the news stories were over-drawn and untruthful, and coupled with these stories were shrieks at the war department to get the boys out of Russia, together with stories of earnest and intended-to-help petitions of the best people of the land, asking and pleading the war department to get the boys out of Russia, then the doughboy’s spirit was depressed.

Suffer he did occasionally. Many of his comrades had a lot of suffering from cold. But aside from the execrable boot that Sir Shackleton had dreamed into existence, he himself possessed more warm clothing than he liked to carry around with him. But not a few soldiers forgot to look around and take sober stock of their actual situation and fell prey to this sob-stuff. Fortunately for the great majority of them, and this goes for every company, the great rank and file of officers and men never lost their heads and their stout hearts.

And now we may as well deal with the actual facts in regard to the alleged mutiny of American troops in North Russia. There was no mutiny.

In February Colonel Stewart had cabled to the War Department that “The alarmist reports of condition of troops in North Russia as published in press end of December are not warranted by facts. Troops have been well taken care of in every way and my officers resent these highly exaggerated reports, feeling that slur is cast upon the regiment and its wonderful record. Request that this be given to the press and especially to Detroit and Chicago papers to allay any unnecessary anxiety.”
Interview with James Siplon, member of the Polar Bear Expedition:

Johnson: What impact did [the Armistice] have on the morale of the American troops?

Siplon: Bad. Bad. Everybody thought they were through then. Everybody thought then that they were going back to Archangel [from forward positions south of Archangel]. But they knew they couldn’t. They knew that the White Sea was frozen over, and they knew they were stuck there for the winter, that they weren’t going to go back. There was no way of getting them out of there. The only way of getting them out of there was that railroad to Vologda, and the Bolsheviks had them stopped there half-way down there. So there was no way of getting them out.

Excerpts from Situation Reports on the Efficiency and Morale of the AEF, North Russia, Dec 1918-Mar 1919 (December 2nd 1918):

From whose perspective does this document seem to be written? When and where was this report written?

Is this a credible source for determining the morale of the AEF in North Russia? Explain.

According to this situation report, what difficulties are the men of the AEF faced with?
Morale of American Troops on Dvina Front by Captain Prince (2-2-1919):

From whose perspective does this document seem to be written? When and where was this report written?

Is this a credible source for determining the morale of the AEF in North Russia? Explain.

According to this report, why were American troops sent to Russia?

What issues seem to be affecting American morale in early 1919?
Excerpts from “Situation Reports on the Efficiency and Morale of the AEF” (2-17-1919):

From whose perspective does this document seem to be written? When and where was this report written?

Is this a credible source for determining the morale of the AEF in North Russia? Explain.

According to this report, what issues are facing the American troops? How might this affect the soldiers’ morale?
Excerpt from “Situation Reports on the Efficiency and Morale of the AEF”:

From whose perspective does this document seem to be written? When and where was this report written?

Is this a credible source for determining the morale of the AEF in North Russia? Explain.

According to this report, what issues are facing the American troops? How might this affect the soldiers’ morale?
Excerpt from “Situation Reports on the Efficiency and Morale of the AEF”:

From whose perspective does this document seem to be written? When and where was this report written?

Is this a credible source for determining the morale of the AEF in North Russia? Explain.

According to this report, what issues are facing the American troops? How might this affect the soldiers’ morale?

Consider the second paragraph of this source. How might the commander’s lack of explanation and his comments in the last two lines have affected the soldiers’ morale?
What Ails the A.N.R.E.F.? by R.S. Clark, Archangel, Russia (April – May, 1919):

From whose perspective does this document seem to be written? When and where was this essay written?

Is this a credible source for determining the morale of the AEF in North Russia? Explain.

This author presents a number of arguments to explain the moral of the AEF. Which of his arguments are most convincing? Why?

Assume that this essay was widely read by AEF soldiers. How might this essay have affected American troops? Should R.S. Clark, the author, have been punished for writing this essay? Should the military try to limit writings of this sort by soldiers during a time of conflict? During peacetime?
Silver Parrish Diary (May 1919):

From whose perspective does this document seem to be written? When and where was this journal entry written?

Is this a credible source for determining the morale of the AEF in North Russia?

What seem to be the author’s primary complaints?

What does it mean that so many soldiers were willing to publicly sign a petition such as this?
July 6, 1919

From: Colonel J.A. Ruggles, Military Attache, Archangel
To: Director of Military Intelligence, War Department, Washington

From whose perspective does this document seem to be written? When and where was this journal entry written?

Is this a credible source for determining the morale of the AEF in North Russia? Explain.

According to the author, what are the soldiers’ primary complaints?
Excerpts from Archangel: The American War with Russia by John Cudahy (1924):

Is a secondary source, such as this, valuable for determining the morale of the AEF in Russia during the 1918-1919 intervention?

According to this account, why were American soldiers disillusioned with their mission in Russia?

Based on this excerpt, what can you infer about the author’s opinion of the reasons the US intervened in Northern Russia?
Protest Petitions Signed (2-4-1919):

Is this a valuable source for determining the status of the moral of American troops in Northern Russia?

Consider the date of the source. Is it likely that the AEF was aware of this petition drive? How might awareness of events in Detroit have affected morale in Northern Russia?
Petition for Withdrawal of Troops from Russia

Is this a valuable source for determining the status of the moral of American troops in Northern Russia?

What arguments are presented in the preface to the petition regarding reasons why the AEF should be brought home?

Consider the dates of the signatures. Is it likely that the AEF was aware of this petition drive? How might awareness of events in Detroit have affected morale in Northern Russia?
That American “Mutiny” in Russia (7-12-19):

Is this a valuable source for determining the status of the moral of American troops in Northern Russia?

According to this source, what issues might have influenced American morale in Northern Russia?
Arhangel in Winter Makes No Hit With Michigan Troops:

Is this a valuable source for determining the status of the moral of American troops in Northern Russia?

What can you infer about the morale of the AEF from this source?
Why Don’t They Send You Home! (Bolshevik Propaganda, 1919):

Is this a valuable source for determining the status of the morale of American troops in Northern Russia?

What arguments are presented in this propaganda? Do you think these arguments might have any effect on American morale? Why or why not?
Why Don’t They Return You Home (Bolshevik Propaganda, 1919):

Is this a valuable source for determining the status of the moral of American troops in Northern Russia?

What arguments are presented in this propaganda? Do you think these arguments might have any effect on American morale? Why or why not?
Is this a valuable source for determining the status of the moral of American troops in Northern Russia?

Why does the author compare American soldiers in France with the American soldiers in Russia (p. 114-115)? Is his a valid argument?

Why does the author describe the intervention as “an unmoral situation” (p. 115-117)? Do you agree with the author?

According to the author, what effect might American intervention have on the rest of the world and the future (p. 116-120)?
Excerpts (page images) from *The history of the American Expedition Fighting the Bolsheviki: Campaigning in North Russia 1918-1919* by Captains J.R. Moore, H.H. Mead, and L.E. Jahns:

When and by whom was this source written? Does it matter that this source was written after the War?

Is this a valuable source for determining the status of the moral of American troops in Northern Russia?

What message about American morale in Russia are the authors trying to portray?
Interview with James Siplon, member of the Polar Bear Expedition:

Is this a valuable source for determining the status of the moral of American troops in Northern Russia?

What does the author say about American morale in Russia?
Appendix C – Russian Perspective of U.S. Intervention

Russian Perspective Documents A-K appear on the following pages of Appendix C.
Excerpt from America’s Secret War Against Bolshevism:

In one of the fuller Soviet indictments of American intention, Ludwig Martens, the unrecognized Soviet representative in New York, declared that the U.S. government “has invaded the territory of Russia with its armed forces and has waged war upon the Russian people; its agents have engaged in plots and intrigues upon Russian soil against the Russian Soviet Government; it has maintained... a blockade which has resulted in great suffering to the Russian people; [and] it has given material encouragement and assistance to various counter-revolutionary bands in insurrection against the Russian Government.”

Comments by Nikita Krushchev (1959):

…Russians… recall the only American military force to set foot on Russian soil with bitterness. When Soviet Premier Nikita Krushchev visited the United States in 1959, he reminded Americans of the [Polar Bear] expedition: “We remember the grim days when American soldiers went to our soil headed by their generals to help our White Guard combat the new revolution….All the capitalist countries of Europe and of America marched upon our country to strangle the new revolution….Never have any of our soldiers been on American soil, but your soldiers were on Russian soil. These are the facts.”

Excerpts from *Rewriting Russian History* regarding Soviet opinion:

…[E]arly [Soviet] writers on intervention, though strongly anti-Allied in their overall conclusions and tone, readily admitted that until the fall of 1918 the Entente’s pressing military need for a re-established Eastern Front was an important, genuine and valid consideration in the formulation of Allied attitudes toward Russia…

[Soviet scholarship divided the intervention into two periods.] …[P]rior to November, 1918, Allied policy toward Russia was primarily concerned with the re-establishment of the Eastern Front. Only after the armistice and the German revolution of November, 1918, did the Entente concentrate on an all-out struggle against Bolshevism.

Excerpts from *Rewriting Russian History* regarding Stalin’s influence:

[A] series of intervention “scares” which accompanied Stalin’s consolidation of power left their mark on Soviet interpretations of the real intervention of 1918-1921. To bolster Soviet charges that the imperialists were wickedly planning new assaults on the Soviet state, Allied and Japanese responsibility for the earlier attacks was re-emphasized and magnified, sometimes to the point of distortion.

A more general and systematic re-interpretation of the Allied and American intervention was undertaken in connection with the official [Soviet] history of the civil war. The story of intervention now became a fable, dedicated to instilling in the Soviet peoples [a] virulent hatred of foreign… enemies.

Opinions from Soviet historians I.I. Mints & A.I. Gukovsky:

[A 1931 Soviet compilation of Lenin’s writings was prefaced by the editors, who stated,] …”the best way to understand and thus to prepare for the struggle against the new, threatening intervention [by the Western capitalist states] is to study the lessons of the old intervention, as pointed out by Lenin.”

[The editors stressed] that one of the chief tasks of the international proletariat in promoting world revolution was to utilize its organized, anti-capitalist strength to thwart or at least weaken any renewal of imperialist intervention against Soviet Russia, the hearth of the socialist revolution.

Excerpts from *British Intervention and the Northern Counter-Revolution* by I.I. Mints:

[Soviet historians] denied that the Allies intervened primarily [for economic reasons] and claimed that the Allies’ choice of north Russia as a locale for intervention is important evidence showing that political and strategic considerations… determined the geographic direction of the Allied attack.

[Soviet historians argued that] the Allies utilized the financial issue chiefly as a slogan with which to arouse… support for the intervention…. [C]lass interest of the imperialists… was the basic motivation behind intervention. In [their] view, the Allies feared that the example and influence of the proletarian revolution in Russia would undermine their own unstable system unless they destroyed the Bolsheviks first.

[They espoused the belief] that the paramount objective… of intervention policy was to weaken and dismember Russia… [in order to] carve out of Russia’s borderlands a group of small independent states which… would serve as a check to the expansion of… Russia.

Other interpretations of Soviet history:

[A 1937 Soviet commission on school textbooks] urged that more emphasis be placed on how the Russian landlords and capitalists… [had] “sold out” Russia to the foreign imperialists…. In addition, Soviet historians of intervention were exhorted to [rouse] “all the peoples to the defense of the fatherland against attacks by foreign bourgeois powers, [and in saving Russia from foreign enslavement and bondage by imperialist countries….”

In April, 1946, when the United States Ambassador, Walter Bedell Smith, asked Stalin what led him to believe that the Western powers were threatening the security of the Soviet Union, Stalin replied by charging that Churchill’s Fulton speech was an unfriendly act and he added: “He [Churchill] tried to instigate war against Russia and persuaded the United States to join him in an armed occupation of part of our territory in 1919.”

Excerpts from Concerning the role of the U.S.A. in the organization of anti-Soviet Intervention in Siberia and the Far East by A. Girshfeld:

[Soviet historian A. Girshfeld wrote extensively in Problems of History (1948) that although] America seemed to play a relatively minor role in intervention… [the U.S.] served as the chief supplier of money and arms to the anti-Soviet forces and also furnished deceitful “democratic” programs designed to neutralize the genuine popular appeal of the Bolshevik… ideology….

[Girshfeld charged] that America’s aggressive designs on [Russia] dated back to the purchase of Alaska and that American “imperialism” counted on dominating and exploiting post-revolutionary Russia…. American capitalists resolved to destroy the Soviet state… [and made] plans for the seizure of the Russian Far East and the organization of an interventionist crusade against Soviet Russia….

Girshfeld [also attacked] Wilson’s Fourteen Points as a spurious “democratic” program designed to delude the European masses and mask American imperialism’s plans for crushing the Bolshevik revolution and establishing American hegemony over the whole world. Point Six dealing with Russia is characterized as a veiled call to intervention and as a scheme for the dismemberment of Russia.

[Finally,] Girshfeld [argued] that, far from playing an insignificant role in intervention, the United States organized, supervised, financed and supplied the anti-Soviet attack and was the chief sponsor of world imperialism’s plans for dismembering Russia and turning it into a colonial country.

Excerpts from *USA—active organizer and participant of armed intervention against Soviet Russia (1918-1920)* by Soviet historian A. Berezkin:

“It was not Wilson, one of the chief inspirers of America’s aggressive policy toward Soviet Russia, who ended intervention. On the contrary, the heroic Soviet people led by the party of Lenin and Stalin defeated the interventionists and drove them from the borders of our motherland.”

“...Ever since the nineteenth century America has steadfastly striven to enslave and exploit the Russian people and that... the United States was the chief inspirer and executor of active anti-Soviet intervention.... Throughout the intervention period... the United States consistently followed an aggressive policy aimed at crushing the Soviet state and subjecting Russia to dismemberment and colonial domination. But the brilliant leadership of Stalin... the unity of the party...the Red Army...and... the Soviet peoples...thwarted American imperialism’s designs and drove out the interventionists.
Excerpts from Soviet Publications (Early 1950s):

…[T]he Soviet press acted as one of the major disseminators of the anti-American version of intervention. Articles attacking the wickedness and bestiality of the American assault on Soviet Russia appeared in a wide range of papers… usually to mark the anniversary of the defeat of the interventionists…

[Some of these articles catalogue] the crimes committed by the American oppressors during intervention… [including] lurid and detailed “eyewitness” accounts of some specific atrocity allegedly perpetrated by the American forces. For example… alleged killings, looting and burning of villages which accompanied American occupation of North Russia and statistically summarized… as follows: hundreds of concentration camps, 52,000 people imprisoned under intolerable conditions of forced labor, cold and hunger, at least 4,000 innocent citizens shot, and millions of rubles worth of goods stolen and exported.

[A particularly graphic example from 1951 included] a letter from a former partisan who described in ghastly detail how the Americans chopped off prisoners’ ears and feet and put out their eyes with burning coals… [In 1953] the Young Communist League [printed] a description from the local paper… of how the American billionaires had ripped open the mouth of a young… partisan and carved a bloody red star on his chest. [The same article concluded:] “Such [events] cultivate a hatred in our young people for the mortal enemies of mankind and teach vigilance against the intrigues of the Anglo-American imperialists.”
Excerpts from *History of the Communist Party-Short Course*, which was written and published by the Communist Party of the USSR:

The Entente imperialists feared that the conclusion of peace between Germany and Russia might improve Germany’s position in the war and correspondingly worsen the position of their own armies. They feared, moreover, that peace between Russia and Germany might stimulate the craving for peace in all countries and on all fronts, and thus interfere with the prosecution of the war and damage the cause of the imperialists. Lastly, they feared that the existence of a Soviet government on the territory of a vast country, and the successes it had achieved at home after the overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie, might serve as an infectious example for the workers and soldiers of the West. Profoundly discontented with the protracted war, the workers and soldiers might follow in the footsteps of the Russians and turn their bayonets against their masters and oppressors. Consequently, the Entente governments decided to intervene in Russia by armed force with the object of overthrowing the Soviet Government and establishing a bourgeois government, which would restore the bourgeois system in the country, annul the peace treaty with the Germans and re-establish the military front against Germany and Austria.

The Entente imperialists launched upon this sinister enterprise all the more readily because they were convinced that the Soviet Government was unstable; they had no doubt that with some effort on the part of its enemies its early fall would be inevitable.

The imperialists of Great Britain, France, Japan and America started their military intervention without any declaration of war, although the intervention was a war, a war against Russia, and the worst kind of war at that. These “civilized” marauders secretly and stealthily made their way to Russian shores and landed their troops on Russia’s territory.

Excerpt from America’s Secret War Against Bolshevism:

What is Martens’ opinion of the American involvement in North Russia?

What words does Martens use to characterize the intervention?
Comments by Nikita Krushchev (1959):

What words does Krushchev use to describe the American intervention?

Why does Krushchev make it a point to say, “Never have any of our soldiers been on American soil, but your soldiers were on Russian soil. These are the facts”? 
Excerpts from *Rewriting Russian History* regarding Soviet opinion:

What does this source imply about Russian perspectives of the AEF?
Excerpts from *Rewriting Russian History* regarding Stalin’s influence:

According to this source, how did Josef Stalin use the Allied intervention for his own political gain?
Opinions from Soviet historians I.I. Mints & A.I. Gukovsky:

According to this source, how was the Allied intervention used to inspire “anti-capitalist” feelings in the 1930s?
Excerpts from *British Intervention and the Northern Counter-Revolution* by I.I. Mints:

According to this Russian source, why did the Allies choose to intervene in Russia in 1918-1919?
Other interpretations of Soviet history:

How did the “Soviet commission” hope to “use” the Allied intervention in North Russia?

How important is “control” over the content of history textbooks?

What is Stalin’s opinion of the Allied intervention?
Excerpts from Concerning the role of the U.S.A. in the organization of anti-Soviet Intervention in Siberia and the Far East by A. Girshfeld:

The source mentions several American policy actions, including the 1918 intervention, the purchase of Alaska, and Wilson’s Fourteen Points, each of which seems fairly benign to Americans, but which seemed aggressive to Russia. What is the Russian perspective of each of these events?

Why does the source argue that the U.S. “was the chief sponsor of world imperialism’s plans for dismembering Russia and turning it into a colonial country?”
Excerpts from *USA—active organizer and participant of armed intervention against Soviet Russia (1918-1920)* by Soviet historian A. Berezkin:

How does Berezkin describe American actions regarding Russia and the Soviet Union?
Excerpts from Soviet Publications (Early 1950s):

How did the Soviet press of the 1950s portray the Allied intervention of 1918-1919?

What effect might these articles have had on Soviet opinion of the United States?
Excerpts from *History of the Communist Party-Short Course*, which was written and published by the Communist Party of the USSR:

According to this source, what were the reasons for Allied intervention in North Russia?

What words are used in this source to describe the Allied intervention?
Appendix D – The Allied Intervention in North Russia, 1918-1920

The following essay can be used as further background for the teacher, who may desire a more in-depth understanding of the Allied Intervention.
The Allied Intervention in North Russia, 1918-1920

The seeds of Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War were probably sown on December 22, 1917, when negotiations began for a separate peace between the Central Powers and Russia. Allied fears of a renewed German offensive on the Western Front aided by German units formerly occupied in the east against the Russians seemed to be coming to fruition. It was in the best interests of the Allies to continue to occupy Germany on the Eastern Front, and to continue an Allied presence in Russia. As negotiations at Brest-Litovsk ground on into 1918, an American military attaché present at the proceedings reported that “There seems to be a feeling at the Smolny [Bolshevik headquarters at the time] that the three powers—United States, Great Britain, and France—should be tolerated here in order to be used against Germany.” This “feeling” would have been reinforced had the Bolsheviks known of a German decision reached on February 13 of the same year. The Germans decided to deny Allied access to North Russia, seek allies in Finland, and advance against both the Murmansk railway and Petrograd (Strakhovsky, 1937, p. 4).

Russia and its new government were therefore understandably concerned when the German armies began their advance. A meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party on February 22, 1918, voted to accept Allied offers of assistance with the provision that they not interfere with Russian foreign policy. Included among the supporters of this measure were both Lenin and Trotsky. The Bolshevik leaders were willing to accept the help of the Allies, but only as a means of maintaining their power within Russia (Strakhovsky, 1937, p. 6,12).

Fear of the German advance and of White Finn forces led to the initial Allied intervention in North Russia. This intervention was effected on March 6, 1918, by a group of 130 Royal
Marines from HMS Glory who had been dispatched at the request of the Murmansk Soviet, whose leader had requested permission from Trotsky in Petrograd to accept Allied help. Trotsky, apparently also afraid of a German advance despite the ongoing talks at Brest-Litovsk, telegraphed his response: “…You must accept any and all assistance from the Allied missions and use every means to obstruct the advance of the plunderers…. ” Regardless of Trotsky’s wishes, the Murmansk Soviet may have accepted Allied assistance anyway, since the 50,000 residents of the city were reliant on the British for their survival (Dobson & Miller, 1986, p. 40-41; Goldhurst, 1978, p. 87).

Murmansk and Archangel

Initial Deployments

The port at Murmansk had been built between 1915 and 1916 as an alternate facility from Archangel to provide Allied supplies to aid the Russian effort on the Eastern Front in World War I. Archangel’s facility was ice-free for only five months of the year, and could not, in that short period, handle the huge amount of supplies flowing into Russia (Dobson & Miller, 1986, p. 41-42). From the end of 1916, Murmansk served as the base for a squadron of British ships whose mission was to patrol the northern sea-lanes for German vessels. This squadron had previously been based out of Archangel. The construction of this new base created additional problems for the Allies that probably exacerbated their fears of a renewed German advance into Russia. The Allied naval blockade of Germany was taking its toll on the war-making abilities of that nation. If Germany were to capture Murmansk, they would have access to another port and Allied resources may not have been sufficient to also blockade the entire Barents Sea (Dobson & Miller, 1986, p. 42-42).
Following the ratification of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Trotsky’s support for a foreign presence in Russia waned as he began to fear potential Allied counter-revolutionary actions. Therefore, Trotsky ordered the Murmansk Soviet to banish the Allies from the region. The Soviet replied that to do so invited attack from both Germans and White Finns, in addition to the fact that the Allies were providing many of the foodstuffs necessary for the citizens of Murmansk to survive. As a compromise, the Murmansk Soviet extracted a promise from the Allies that they had no intention of supporting the independence of the region. This allayed Woodrow Wilson’s fears of intervention, as well as providing the British and the French with a staging area for their later advance on Archangel (Goldhurst, 1978, p. 88; Strakhovsky, 1937, p. 28-29).

At Murmansk during the time of the landing of the Royal Marines were several Russian battleships, including the Chesma and the Askold, whose crews had mutinied and were residing on their vessels or in Murmansk itself, for a total of around 2,000 revolutionary Russian soldiers in the area of Murmansk (Dobson & Miller, 1986, p. 45). The commander-in-chief of the Allied troops in North Russia was British Major General Frederick C. Poole. At that point, Poole’s instructions from the British War Office were to resist German advances into northern Russia, to enable the Russians to again take the field on the side of the Allies, and to aid the connection of forces with the Czechs in the south and with Admiral Kolchak in the east (Strakhovsky, 1937, p. 49, note 65).

Allied Military Actions in North Russia

The first action of the intervention occurred when marines of HMS Cochrane, reinforced by members of the French Military Mission to Rumania, set out at the request of the Murmansk Soviet to aid a group of Red Finns who had been pushed across the border by White Finns and
were being harassed along the Murmansk to Petrograd railway. The small British/French force traveled by rail south to the village of Kandalaksha, where they frightened off the White forces without any serious confrontation. British soldiers in support of the Bolsheviks fired the first shots of the intervention in early May 1918. Reports had arrived that a force of White Finns, then allied with Germany, had taken the village of Pachenga, roughly thirty miles west of Murmansk. Acting out of fear of the Germans gaining a northern foothold, and at the request of the Murmansk Soviet, the British landed a small force of Marines at Pachenga, and by May 10, had secured control of the village (Dobson & Miller, 1986, p. 45-46). The primary fear was that the Germans might use Pachenga as a submarine base, although it was later concluded that the location was quite unsuitable for submarine operations (Ullman, 1961, p. 175). After this incident, the Allied forces in North Russia were reinforced under the command of British Major-General Sir Charles Maynard, who was to control all Allied forces at Murmansk and who would oversee training of 25,000 Czech soldiers who were reportedly making their way north (Dobson & Miller, 1986, p. 48).

By the time Maynard’s force arrived at Murmansk on June 22, 1918, the Bolsheviks were coming under increased pressure from Germany to expel the Allied forces on Russian soil. This left Maynard in a position of potential attack by Germans and Finns on his right flank and by Bolsheviks from the south. Maynard reacted by sending small groups of soldiers down the railway to Kandalaksha and Kem to stop Bolshevik reinforcements from surprising Allied forces at Murmansk. In addition, at this time, plans were being made for British Major-General Frederick Poole to be sent with Allied forces from Murmansk to Archangel. Poole’s mission was to receive the Czech forces and train them at Archangel, and to prevent the further sacking
of Allied war materiel from warehouses at Archangel by Bolshevik forces (Dobson and Miller, 1986, p. 52).

Reportedly, the Bolsheviks were removing pre-positioned wartime supplies from Archangel at the rate of 3,000 tons per week (Dobson & Miller, 1986, p. 61). Archangel had been a major supply point for Allied materiel intended to aid the Russian government against the Germans on the Eastern Front. By early 1918, at various port facilities in and around Archangel, 162,495 tons of supplies had been stockpiled. Included were barbed wire, small arms, shells, artillery, trucks, and raw metals. The Allied nations viewed these supplies as partially their own, since they had depleted their own meager stores to supply Russia, and because the supplies had been paid for with loans from the Allied powers. Therefore, the Allies had a keen interest in maintaining some control over these materials after the Bolsheviks obtained control of the Russian government. In January 1918, the Petrograd government dispatched an “Extraordinary Commission” to Archangel with the mission of ensuring Bolshevik control of the city, as well as arranging for the immediate transport to the interior of Russia of war material stored at the nearby port of Bakaritsa. This move alarmed the Allied governments, particularly since they feared that the supplies might eventually end up in German hands and because the Bolshevik government had repudiated all debts of former Russian governments, which meant that not only had the Allies provided these materials at great cost to their own war-making capability, but the Russians were also refusing to pay for them. This set the stage for General Poole’s August 1918 expedition against Archangel (Goldhurst, 1978, p. 89; Kennan, 1958, p. 17-20).

Maynard’s actions of the last days of June would set the course of Allied actions in North Russia for the next few years, and perhaps determine course of events for decades. The General set out on June 27, 1918, to visit his southern garrisons. At Kandalaksha Maynard found a
trainload of Red Guards on their way north from Petrograd to throw the Allies out of Murmansk. Maynard was able to bluff the Red Guard commander into staying in Kandalaksha before he set off for Kem. These troops were later disarmed and sent by rail back toward Petrograd. At Kem were two trainloads of Red Guards set on pushing the Allies out of Murmansk. Maynard’s troops at Kem disarmed these soldiers and also sent them back south with the convincing stare of a naval 12-pounder gun ensuring their peaceful departure. As a follow-up, Maynard ordered the seizure of all arms along the route from Murmansk to Kem. Generally this operation went smoothly, but the Kem Soviet refused to cooperate. In the ensuing arrests and confusion, the three leading members of the Kem Soviet were shot and killed. Maynard pressed on and removed Bolshevik resistance as far south as Soroka, halfway to Petrograd from Murmansk. While this action was undertaken on land, a small contingent of American and French marines at Murmansk had captured the Russian cruiser *Askold*, whose crew had been against the alliance between the Murmansk Soviet and the Allied forces (Dobson & Miller, 1986, p. 54-58).

**Expedition to Archangel**

General Poole’s mission to Archangel left Murmansk in early August with about 1500 men consisting of French, Polish, British, and American soldiers. Poole’s move on Archangel was planned to be an invasion against the pro-Bolshevik government of Archangel. This invasion was to be accompanied by a British engineered coup against the Archangel Soviet. Poole’s naval force met light resistance at Mudyug Island as they neared Archangel, but continued southward. The Bolshevik government fled Archangel; Poole seized the city on August 3, 1918, and was met by a new pro-Ally, anti-German, anti-Bolshevik government (Dobson & Miller, 1986, p. 63-64; Goldhurst, 1978, p. 90-91). From Archangel, Poole began sending armed parties up the Dvina River and south along the railway to push back Bolshevik resistance. Part of Poole’s
rationale for advancing southward was that if his mission was to guard military stores in Archangel, he was perfectly justified in trying to recapture supplies already taken by Bolshevik troops (Cortright, 1998, par. 12). By September 3, 1918, Poole’s soldiers had captured the river town of Bereznik, 125 miles inland from Archangel, and Obozerskaya, 75 miles down the railway from Archangel; both locations were short of Poole’s objective of Kotlas. This was just three days before 4,477 American soldiers arrived at Archangel, making the U.S. contribution to the Archangel expedition by far the largest of the Allied nations; the British comprised the next largest contingent with 2,420 soldiers (Cortright, 1998, par. 13; Dobson & Miller, 1986, p. 131-133).

Poole’s problems were compounded by American resentment toward British control of all aspects of the Archangel expedition, lack of supplies, lack of reinforcements, and difficulties with the new government of Archangel, which was opposed by both the bourgeoisie of the city and former Tsarist officers. These tensions led to a coup and the temporary exile of the city’s government. Poole was harshly criticized for his lack of action during the coup and for his attitudes towards the Russians, who he regarded as something of an offensive obstacle to his military goals. In the end, Poole was recalled to England and was replaced by Major-General Edmund Ironside, who had his own clear opinions about the mission in Russia. Ironside blamed the situation on “Bolshevism, which means anarchy pure and simple.” Also at fault, according to the General, were Jews, and a developing culture of violence. Ironside did not intend to conquer Russia, but merely to “help her and see her a great power. We shall clear out, but only when we have attained our object, and that is, the restoration of Russia” (Dobson & Miller, 1986, p. 136-138). Additionally, Ironside suspended Poole’s drive to Kotlas, preferring to focus on guarding
Archangel, although a number of outposts south of the city continued to be occupied by Allied troops (Cortright, 1998, par. 24).

A large Bolshevik offensive followed Ironside’s accession to power in Archangel in October and November, 1918. The British had withdrawn their gunboats from the upper reaches of the Dvina for fear of being frozen in for the winter. This action left the advance troops without much of their artillery support, a situation that the Bolsheviks capitalized on by immediately moving their boats down the river to attack Allied positions. The offensive lasted from October 4 to November 15, with the largest attack taking place at Toulgas, where 2,000 to 2,500 Bolsheviks attacked an Allied position of 400 to 600 soldiers. Ironically, some of the shells used against the Allied soldiers in Toulgas during the latter days of the offensive were made in the United States; the very shells the Allies had been sent to Archangel to protect (Cortright, 1998, par. 24, 26, 41; Dobson & Miller, 1986, p. 139-141).

**Late 1918 – Murmansk**

Into the latter months of 1918, General Maynard’s greatest concern at Murmansk was that German troops, or White Finns, might sweep across the Finnish border, cut the railway at Kandalaksha, preventing British reinforcements, and advance upon the main body of Allied troops at Murmansk. In Maynard’s mind, his forays down the rail line toward Petrograd were perfectly justified as a means of protecting his seemingly precarious position. He insisted that “our embroilment with Bolshevik Russia must be regarded as a thing apart,” although the Bolshevik government in Petrograd did not hold the same opinion, thus Maynard met increasing Bolshevik resistance the farther south his troops moved (Dobson & Miller, 1986, p. 118-119).

In fact, the real threat to Murmansk was relatively small and was dealt with in September 1918. Allied columns from both Kandalaksha and Kem moved to engage small forces of White
Finns. Maynard’s troops soundly defeated the Finns at Ukhtinskaya on September 11, 1918. Rather than viewing this victory as the end of the threat from Finland, which it was, Maynard worried that the Germans might retaliate, and set about reinforcing his positions south of Murmansk with the 15,000 troops then under his command, which were comprised primarily of British soldiers, but also included sizable numbers of Italians, Serbs, French, Russians, and Finns (Dobson & Miller, 1986, p. 120-122).

What followed for Maynard was an autumn comprised of workers strikes, worries about the security of Murmansk, resistance from local Bolshevik supporters, a serious lack of money to pay local workers, and the accession of a new Murmansk Soviet. During a trip to London in the waning days of 1918, Maynard met with the White Finnish leader, General Mannerheim, against whom General Maynard’s forces had been fighting since the spring of the year. Obviously enough to both men, neither was any longer a threat to the other, and the largest threat to Maynard and his positions was now the Bolsheviks. When Maynard returned to Murmansk in the early days of 1919, he fully realized this reality, and believed that “Russia’s leaders had not been chosen by the people. Their rule was hated, and they owed their retention of power solely to the terror inspired by systematic bloodshed and massacre…” (Dobson & Miller, 1986, p. 121-125).

Late 1918 – Archangel

General Ironside and his troops spent the winter of 1918-1919 fighting extreme cold, low morale, mutiny, and periodic Bolshevik attacks at remote forward locations. In addition, Ironside had to contend with an active underground Bolshevik movement in Archangel itself. This movement worked to inspire mutiny among the Allied soldiers and put pressure upon the officers to withdraw from Russia. By the middle of April 1919, the underground movement had
been contained and the Bolshevik offensive had been stopped. General Maynard spent his winter in much the same way, launching a minor offensive south against the Bolsheviks and receiving a message that he and Ironside were to prepare to evacuate Russia by the summer of 1919 (Dobson & Miller, 1986, p. 187-194).

Planning for Evacuation

The problem faced by London, and by Maynard and Ironside, was how to evacuate in an orderly manner without a serious confrontation with the Bolsheviks, as well as how to allow the British-supported government of North Russia time to establish itself prior to Allied withdrawal. To this effect, Britain proposed a three-part plan. First, decisive attacks would be mounted from both Murmansk and Archangel to push back the Bolsheviks and discourage them from interfering with the evacuation. Second, the Allied forces must aid in a union between the forces of North Russia and Admiral Alexander Kolchak’s Siberian Army, which was also fighting against the Bolsheviks and moving west toward Moscow. Finally, Britain must create a force responsible for training North Russian units. To this effect a volunteer force of 8,000 British soldiers was raised and sent to Archangel. These soldiers arrived on May 27, 1919, and took the places of Americans and Canadians, who were then evacuated from Russia (Dobson & Miller, 1986, p. 195, 199-200).

Evacuation of Archangel – Early 1919

General Ironside’s difficulties were greater than simply engineering an orderly evacuation. In May 1919 a company of North Russian soldiers mutinied and killed two of their officers. Ironside disarmed the company, executed fifteen men, and made the rest into a labor unit. Additionally, Ironside’s planned junction with Kolchak was stalled due to a defeat suffered by Kolchak’s western army that stopped their western movement. The War Department also
worried about the possibility of engaging British forces so deeply that additional reinforcements would be required to extract those forces already in Russia (Dobson & Miller, 1986, p. 201-202). Despite these fears, and Ironside’s own reservations, an unsuccessful offensive directed toward Kotlas was launched in late June 1919, with the bulk of the fighting to be done by a North Russian unit. Interestingly, this action was supported not only by British and North Russian aircraft, but also by the use of poison gas, which was delivered for the first time in history by airplanes (Dobson & Miller, 1986, p. 203-204). In the end, it was probably the disaffection by North Russian soldiers that doomed Ironside’s offensive. Mutiny became more and more common, so much so that Ironside felt it necessary to request the deployment of a tank unit from England to intimidate his White Russian allies (Dobson & Miller, 1986, p. 209).

The summer of 1919 was fraught with mutiny among the ranks of the North Russian troops. Both Russian and British officers were killed, and some of the mutineers were executed. Perhaps the most dangerous of these mutinies took place at Onega on July 21, 1919, where Ironside’s and Maynard’s commands joined. This bloodless mutiny left the Bolsheviks in command of a piece of territory that effectively split the Allied and North Russian forces. Had the Bolsheviks attacked to the west, they would have cut Maynard’s lines of communications with his forward-deployed troops. If the attack were to the east, Ironside’s deployments along the railroad would be threatened. Perhaps more importantly, this mutiny showed the degree of support for the Bolsheviks among the North Russians, and made clear that North Russia would never stand without Allied support. Despite this, fierce fighting continued around Archangel as the British withdrew and shortened their perimeter. Ironside was determined to hurt the Bolsheviks so badly that they would be either unwilling or unable to interfere with the final
evacuation of British troops. On September 27, 1919, the last British soldiers were evacuated from Archangel (Dobson & Miller, 1986, p. 212-214, 219).

Evacuation of Murmansk – Early 1919

In Murmansk, General Maynard was fighting his own small war in the early summer of 1919. A series of small victories against the Bolsheviks put Maynard’s troops in a position to push south to Lake Onega. Despite a previous no-offense order by the War Department, Maynard received permission to press south to the lake. This action lasted from May 1 to May 21, when Medvezhya Gora, on the north shore of Lake Onega, fell to Maynard’s British, French, Serbian, American, and Russian soldiers. From this position, Maynard launched small actions throughout the summer both along the shore of the lake and on the water. As with Ironside in Archangel, Maynard’s goal was to bloody the Bolsheviks to a point where they would not or could not interfere with the scheduled evacuation of Murmansk (Dobson & Miller, 1986, p. 221-223). The last Allied troopship left Murmansk on the evening of October 12, 1919. Murmansk fell to the Red Army the following March (Dobson & Miller, 1986, p. 231).

Politics of the Intervention

The Allied intervention in the Russian civil war was probably motivated by two primary factors. The Allies were fearful of what would be the final German offensive on the Western Front in mid-1918, which would be reinforced by German troops evacuating the Eastern Front due to Russia’s withdrawal from the war. Anti-Bolshevism was a secondary, but eventually equally important cause of the intervention, as some saw Bolshevism as one of the greatest threats to the Allied nations (Foglesong, 1997, p. 106).
Fear of Germany

On April 13, 1918, a telegram from Admiral Sims, who was in charge of Allied naval operations in Europe, to the U.S. Secretary of the Navy outlined the instructions by which Allied forces were to operate in North Russia. Allied forces were to “protect and further” Allied interests in the region, but were not to be committed on land beyond the area of the port of Murmansk. The secondary objective was to support local resistance to potential German offensives (U.S. Dept. of State, 1932, Sims to Daniels, April 13, 1918). A further telegram in early June explained that General Poole would be given permission to organize resistance and military training at both Murmansk and Archangel as a defensive precaution against German activity (U.S. Dept. of State, 1932, Sims to Daniels, June 3, 1918).

On June 30, 1918, the Murmansk Regional Council, composed of various local “committees,” and attended by British, American, and French representatives, adopted a resolution defining their position regarding the intervention. The signatories of this resolution included General Poole and Captain B.B. Bierer, commander of the USS Olympia, then in port at Murmansk. The preface to this resolution makes clear that the Allies and the Regional Council were most concerned with the potential German threat to the Murmansk region. Therefore, the Regional Council formally rejected the instructions of the Russian government to protest the Allied occupation of Murmansk, deciding that to do so would be “an act of suicide and disaster for Russia, and especially for the Murmansk district” (U.S. Dept. of State, 1932, Bierer to Sims, July 6, 1918). Article 1 of this resolution explicitly states that full mutual cooperation will be instituted for the sole purpose of defending Murmansk from Germany. Article 3 explains that while Russian forces should ideally remain independent from Allied forces, they may join Allied units and serve with them against the Germans. Finally, the articles of the resolution explain that
the Allies will further supply the Murmansk region with those materials, such as food and textiles, necessary for the survival of the populace (U.S. Dept. of State, 1932, Bierer to Sims, July 6, 1918).

Regarding American troops at Murmansk, a telegram from the Acting Secretary of State of the United States to the Consul at Archangel explained that American troops would be stationed at Murmansk, but would not take part in any expeditions into Russia (U.S. Dept. of State, 1932, Polk to Cole, July 30, 1918). On the contrary, on August 27, 1918, the U.S. Ambassador in Russia explained that he would encourage American troops to proceed inland to such places as Kotlas, Petrograd, and Moscow, where it was believed that the Soviet government had stored supplies removed from Archangel (U.S. Dept. of State, 1932, Francis to Lansing, August 27, 1918).

Following the November 11 Armistice, American troops in North Russia began to question the validity of the reasons for their intervention. Not only did these troops question the extent of the German threat after the Armistice; they also began to suspect the intentions of the British in North Russia. Many believed the British to be imperialistic, and were seen as using the American forces for ends not agreed to by the United States. Additionally, DeWitt Poole, American Consul at Moscow, believed that to withdraw Allied forces would subject the populace of the Murmansk region to Bolshevik recriminations (U.S. Dept. of State, 1932, Poole to Lansing, November 13, 1918). By November 29, 1918, Poole was representing the mission of the Allied forces as that of the noble hero come to support the downtrodden until they can support themselves. In an address to American troops in Archangel, Poole stated that the real revolutionaries of Russia, who desired to establish “free government for people just emerged
from centuries [of] black ignorance and oppression,” were imprisoned by the Bolsheviks. Poole represented the “Bolsheviki” as a
gang of political adventurers admittedly sustained by German money, German intrigue, seeking German military ends in Russia’s confusion, Russia’s dismemberment, abasement. These political adventurers aim not at what we conceive democracy where every man entitled to life, liberty, etc., but at what they call ‘dictatorship of [the] proletariat’. You are protecting one spot in Russia from [the] sanguinary bedlam of Bolshevism, you are keeping safe one spot where [the] real progressives of Russian revolution may begin to lay [the] foundation of [a] great free Russian state which is to come (U.S. Dept. of State, 1932, Poole to Lansing, November 29, 1918).
Thus, Poole appealed to the chivalric and patriotic natures of the soldiers in an attempt to quell their dissatisfaction and to delineate their mission.

Initially, President Woodrow Wilson had objected to Allied intervention in Russia, but was pressured by other Allied nations to reconsider. Many believed that the Eastern Front could be reconstituted by a joint Japanese-Allied intervention in Siberia. The intervention in northern Russia was added almost as an afterthought on the pretense of guarding and recovering wartime materiel provided to Russia.

How an intervention would recreate the eastern front, or even compel Germany to retain its massive armies in the east, was never adequately explained. It was taken almost as a matter of pure faith that landing forces on one side of Russia would make Germany keep its troops thousands of miles away on the other side (Calhoun, 1993, p. 115).
Wilson alone opposed the interventions, but was conflicted by his refusal to aid the Allies in Russia and his belief in collective security. Ultimately, it was this conviction that swayed Wilson
to the Allies’ point of view, although he absolutely wanted to avoid any interference with Russia’s political situation and accepted only “modest and experimental” plans for intervention (Calhoun, 1993, p. 115).

Despite his tacit approval, Wilson continued to fear the threat of Japanese imperialism in Siberia. He also believed that intervention took troops and materiel from the more important action on the Western Front and that intervention was likely to be seen as direct political interference with the Russian government. However, events in Russia would unfold to the advantage of Wilson’s conscience and his policy objectives of collective security and self-determination (Calhoun, 1993, p. 117).

The revolt of Czech prisoners of war on their way to Vladivostok placed the Allies, and particularly Wilson, in a unique situation. The Czech soldiers had indicated their willingness to cooperate with the Allied nations and were becoming further involved in clashes with the Bolsheviks. By offering to help the Czechs, Wilson could deploy troops to North Russia as a moral mission to save the Czechs from the Bolsheviks, which was quite a different thing from intervening in Russia to save the Russians from themselves. “By claiming that he wanted to assist the Czechs, Wilson was saying, in effect, that the old arguments in favor of intervention were still no good, but a new, more persuasive reason had arisen.” It was only after the Armistice that the interventions really took on a decided anti-Bolshevik tone (Calhoun, 1986, p. 206, 217; Calhoun, 1993, p. 117, 121-122).

Woodrow Wilson had made it clear that American troops participating in the Russian intervention were only to be used to guard stores of war materiel from capture by Germany, and to aid the Czechs in leaving Russia, but not, according to General T. Bliss, “to help any party of Russians against any other party or against any form of Russian government or to help that
government against them” (Calhoun, 1986, p. 216). Following the Armistice in November 1918, many questioned the right of the intervening powers to remain in Russia, as well as the validity of their mission after the defeat of Germany and the Central Powers. United States Secretary of War, Newton Baker, questioned whether American soldiers should remain in Russia, and feared that these troops were “being used for purposes for which we would not have sent them in the first instance” (Calhoun, 1986, p. 217). Baker’s recommendation was that the “first boat” bring the troops home and that future aid to Russia be limited to economic and moral support. However, Baker realized that under the principles of collective security and international cooperation, the soldiers could not simply be immediately withdrawn without agreement from the Allies during the negotiations scheduled to begin in Paris in January 1919 (Calhoun, 1986, p. 218).

There were those in the United States government at the time, however, who feared Bolshevism and viewed it as the next great threat and saw its potential defeat as reason enough to maintain the intervention forces in Russia. Secretary of State Lansing, while stopping short of advocating the continuation of the intervention, believed that Bolshevism was the “most hideous and monstrous thing that the human mind has ever conceived,” and therefore should not be allowed to spread to western Europe. He feared that if the Allies were to make Germany and Austria completely impotent during the Paris conference, there was a significant risk of giving “life to a being more atrocious than the malignant thing created by the science of Frankenstein.” Thus, the enemy of the Allies became less Germany and more Bolshevism (Calhoun, 1986, p. 218).
Anti-Bolshevism

During the peace negotiations in Paris that began in January 1919, President Wilson’s advisors, who included both Secretary of State Lansing and General Tasker Bliss, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, continually advised that the United States should withdraw all troops from Russia at the earliest opportunity. When, in April, the Americans received word that General Ironside in Archangel intended to push farther into Russia, and had requested additional reinforcements, Wilson confronted British Prime Minister Lloyd George. The prime minister insisted that the withdrawal from North Russia was proceeding in secrecy and that perhaps the request for additional troops was a bluff, although he went on to say that the request had been granted. As the spring of 1919 wore on, the British maintained pressure for continued American cooperation in the intervention (Calhoun, 1986, p. 225-230).

By May 20, 1919, Wilson admitted that he had no policy toward Russia. The President was unsure of which avenue to take: help the Czechs, feed the Russian population, advance the cause of collective security, promote self-determination, or fight Bolshevism (Calhoun, 1986, p. 232). The one direction that many in Paris focused on was eliminating Bolshevism. Wilson believed this to be a difficult, if not impossible, task. To eliminate “Bolshevism is to eliminate its causes. This is a formidable task: What its exact causes are, we do not know” (Calhoun, 1986, p. 241). Despite these misgivings voiced by the Americans, Britain and France seemed to press for the elimination of Bolshevism by force. Ferdinand Foch argued for an Allied military intervention across Central Europe and into Russia. American officials, while not discounting the threat posed by Bolshevism to a war-ravaged continent, felt that the answer lay in reconstruction rather than in destruction. General Bliss agreed with this viewpoint, rebutting Foch’s plan by stating that “we could prevent Bolsheviks from crossing the line, but that we
could not prevent Bolshevism from crossing it.” Woodrow Wilson agreed, believing that “the real thing with which to stop Bolshevism is food.” As Allied leaders disputed the true nature of Bolshevism and debated the best means of its control, lower officials from all nations, including Winston Churchill and Secretary of State Lansing, became more vociferous in their condemnation of Bolshevism and their belief in the use of force to stop its spread (Calhoun, 1986, p. 242-243).

Even as early as December 1917, Secretary of State Robert Lansing wondered whether the United States should view the Bolsheviks as the enemy in the nation’s pursuit of the defeat of Germany. He observed “that the Bolsheviki are determined to prevent Russia from taking further part in the war,” which could prolong hostilities by two to three years. Further, “with Bolsheviki domination broken the Russian armies might be reorganized and become an important factor in the war by next spring or summer.” In conclusion, Lansing recommended supporting those forces strong enough to have a chance at supplanting the Bolsheviks as the dominant military force in Russia (U.S. Dept. of State, 1940, Lansing to Wilson, December 10, 1917). By 1919, Ernest Harris, the consul general at Irkutsk, advised that Bolshevism was no longer just a Russian problem, but one “which endangers all humanity,” and Winston Churchill advocated the military overthrow of the Lenin government (Calhoun, 1986, p. 242-243).

As seen above, further involvement in the Russian civil war accomplished nothing for the Allies, and certainly did not limit the power of Bolshevism. Perhaps the Allies would have done better to listen to Felix Cole, American Consul at Archangel, who, on June 1, 1918, made an impassioned and well-reasoned argument against intervention in Russia. He argued that to hold Archangel required controlling the territory south of the city along the Dvina River and along the Archangel-Vologda Railroad. This meant, according to Cole, that the eastern front would be
replaced by a “Russian front” that “will lie somewhere north of Moscow, somewhere east of Petrograd, and somewhere west of the southern Ural Mountains.” Obviously, this would create a very difficult logistical situation, compounded by the fact that, in Cole’s opinion, the Allies would also have to provision the residents of the region, as Moscow would necessarily cut all food shipments to the region in the event of an intervention, a number that Cole estimated to be somewhere between 500,000 and 1,500,000 people. Additionally, Cole saw no base of support among the Russian lower classes, and only conditional support among the bourgeoisie. Finally, and perhaps most presciently, Cole observed that intervention would undermine “future friendship and economic cooperation,” and was doomed to failure because “every foreign invasion that has gone deep into Russia has been swallowed up” (U.S. Dept. of State, 1932, Cole to Francis, June 1, 1918).

Conclusion

Whether the reasoning was based on a fear of Germany or on anti-Bolshevist sentiments, the Allied intervention and involvement in North Russia and the Baltics accomplished very little. What originated as a mission to protect materiel stored at the northern ports quickly evolved into a confused campaign into the bitter cold of the Russian wilderness with no over-riding policy for guidance, particularly after November 11, 1918.

What is still disputed is the overall effect of the intervention on relations between the Soviet Union and the West, as well as the ever present “what if” questions. Some, including Winston Churchill, have argued that the mission of the Allies against the Bolsheviks in North Russia could have been accomplished with more forces. Churchill’s stance is that two more divisions would have allowed the Allies to take Moscow from the north. However, history has
shown that even massive armies have failed to effectively penetrate the Russian heartland (Goldhurst, 1978, p. 270; Ullman, 1961, p. 333).

As far as the effect on Germany’s capability to wage war on the Western Front, it is doubtful that the Germans truly feared the reconstitution of the Eastern Front. Erich Ludendorff stated that, despite the intervention, the Germans left only those troops necessary for occupation in the east, while transferring the rest to France. Additionally, the only German troops kept from fighting by the intervention were those prisoners of war that were to be repatriated under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. According to Ludendorff, this was as much attributable to the Czech occupation of the Trans-Siberian Railway as to the Bolshevik failure to actually repatriate the prisoners (as cited in Ullman, 1961, p. 333).

Finally, some have argued that the Allied intervention of 1918-1919 precipitated the Cold War by initiating a distrust of the West by Communist leaders. This, in effect, withdrew the economy of the USSR from the world in succeeding years, and left a lasting imprint on Soviet leaders. Nikita Kruschev, during his 1959 visit to the United States, stated that “We remember the grim days when American soldiers went to our soil headed by their generals to help our White Guard combat the new revolution. All the capitalist countries in Europe and America marched upon our country…. Never have any of our soldiers been on American soil, but your soldiers were on Russian soil” (Goldhurst, 1978, p. 268). However, this viewpoint is disputed by British historian David Footman, who argues that the Cold War would have occurred regardless of whether any intervention took place (as cited in Goldhurst, 1978, p. 268).

The only aspect of the intervention that enjoys any sort of consensus is that historians continue to disagree over the effectiveness and long-term effects of the action. Perhaps the Allies would have been better off had they signed their own Brest-Litovsk in 1919.
References for The Allied Intervention in North Russia, 1918-1920


Further Resources:

**Polar Bears / Northern Russia:**

Polar Bear Digital Collections at the Bentley Historical Library – University of Michigan
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/polaread/history.html

The Bentley Historical Library is home to the nation’s premier collection of Polar Bear-related manuscripts and images. Much of their collection has been digitized and is searchable.

“Detroit’s Own Polar Bears” in Northern Russia
http://ss.sites.mtu.edu/mhugl/2016/10/14/detroits-own-polar-bears-in-northern-russia/

This article provides a concise overview of the Polar Bear expedition to Northern Russia.

Voices of a Never Ending Dawn
http://polarbeardocumentary.com/

“Voices” is an acclaimed documentary based on items from the Bentley Historical Library collection that focuses on the Northern Russia intervention.

339th Infantry A.E.F. in Northern Russia (1918-1919)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qyzDGPqZWcs

This archival Signal Corps video is available on Youtube and includes a variety of items, such as Russian peasants, soldier recreational activities (ice-skating and sledding), footage of patrols and drills, and many other aspects of the intervention.

Polar Bear Oral History Collection
http://digitalcommons.hope.edu/polar_bear/

A project of Hope College, this site provides both oral and written interviews with a number of Polar Bears. Interviews were conducted in the late-1970s.

**Cold War:**

Edsitement Lesson: The Strategy of Containment

This lesson contains a link for an excerpted version of George Kennan’s famous “Sources of Soviet Conduct” essay, first published in 1947. Presents an American viewpoint of the origins of the Cold War.
Edsitement Lesson: Sources of Discord

This lesson contains a link for an excerpted version of Henry Wallace’s essay, “Achieving an Atmosphere of Mutual Trust and Confidence,” which discusses the Allied intervention of World War I as a root cause of the Cold War.

The Wilson Center: Digital Archive – Novikov Telegram
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110808.pdf?v=c46f797bf3d939c2c328ac98eb778f09

This site is a repository for a huge number of Cold War-related documents, including the Novikov Telegram of 1946, which lays out a Soviet viewpoint of the origins of the Cold War—very much a juxtaposition to the Kennan essay above.

Other World War I:

Operation War Diary
https://www.operationwardiary.org/

A Zooniverse “citizen-science” project that asks individuals to transcribe British war diaries from WWI. A very interesting glimpse into the day-to-day life of British soldiers of all ranks, nationalities, and wartime positions.

Measuring the ANZACs
https://www.measuringtheanzacs.org/#/

Very similar to Operation War Diary, but with a focus on the ANZACs
Bibliography for Polar Bears, Cold War, and Questions of Duty:


